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Investment managers of employee benefit plans recently have devel-
oped considerable interest in the utilization of commodity futures con-
tracts.' A few very large plans have begun trading commodity futures2
and it appears that others are about to do so.$ Several substantial legal
problems, however, confront both plans interested in using futures and
those who would assist plans in such trading. Some of these problems are
caused by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
4
others are caused by long-standing employee plan trust investment rules
contained in or derived from the Internal Revenue Code (Code)5, and still
others are caused by banking, futures and securities regulation.
Most of the plans that are trading or are considering trading in com-
modity futures are large plans with skilled investment advisers, either in-
house or retained. These plans have the resources to develop in-house
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I See, Gurwin, Do Interest Rate Futures Have a Future in Pension Land?, 14 INsTrrM-
TIONAL IN STOR 99 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Gurwin]; Little, Financial Futures: A New
Investment Path, PENSIONS & INVEsTmENTs, July 30, 1979, at 1; Pianko & Selig, Investment
of Pension Fund Assets in Financial Instrument Futures, TAx MNGM'T (BNA) § 80-1
(1980).
2 See Cohen, Financial Futures Mart Gets Boost From Sears Pension, FUTUREs INDus.
Assoc. BuLL. #5510 (1979); DuPont Begins Using Futures Markets After Overcoming
ERISA Woes, SEcumTEs WEEK, Oct. 22, 1979, at 6. [hereinafter cited as DuPont Futures]
3 See General Electric Pension Ready for In-Again, Out-Again Use of Futures, SEcUR-
rrnEs WEEK, Aug. 4, 1980, at 6. Cf., Nobbe-Asher, Big Changes at Standard Indiana, PEN-
SIONS AND INvESTMENTS, August 4, 1980, at 1 (investment in commodity futures through
index fund).
4 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 826
(Title I codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1241 (1976) (as amended)) [hereinafter cited as ERISA
or the Act]. In this article all references are to sections of ERISA rather than the United
States Code.
5 Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (as amended) [hereinafter cited as I.R.C. or the Code].
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expertise or retain individuals with expertise in the futures markets.
These plans have another advantage in that they can afford a significant
commitment to commodity futures trading as an integral part of a com-
prehensive investment program.
Smaller plans might also realize benefits from trading in commodity
futures, although because of cost considerations they may be too small to
trade directly. Therefore, these plans may create a demand for pooled
investment vehicles designed specifically to allow employee plans to util-
ize commodity futures. Through such vehicles smaller plans can reap at
least some of the benefits of commodity futures trading.
This article discusses briefly why a plan might wish to trade commod-
ity futures,$ and then considers the legal problems involved both for plans
trading directly and for plans trading through pooled investment vehicles.
II. Commodity Futures Trading
A. In General
In general, commodity futures trading is governed by the Commodity
Exchange Act 7 and regulations of the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (CFTC). The twelve commodity futures exchanges currently op-
erating in the United States offer futures trading in a wide range of com-
modities. The kinds of commodities for which contracts are traded on
these exchanges can be divided into four categories: agricultural commod-
ities, metals, currencies, and interest-bearing paper. In each case, the fu-
tures contract covers a standard amount and description of a commodity.
For example, on the Chicago Board of Trade, where the first interest rate
future was traded on October 20, 1975, Government National Mortgage
Association bond futures are traded in units of $100,000 face amount.
The actual terms and conditions of the contracts are found in the rules of
the exchanges: the trader does not literally acquire a document, but
merely a set of contractual rights. Another unique characteristic of fu-
tures trading is that futures contracts can only be bought and sold by
open outcry on the floors of the exchanges in trading "pits." The Com-
modity Exchange Act does not permit an over-the-counter market for fu-
6 A complete description of the mechanics of commodity futures transactions and a
comprehensive treatment of the benefits which employee plans can derive from trading in
commodity futures is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, a basic description is given of
commodity futures trading followed by a few examples of how commodity futures might
typically be traded by employee plans. For an overview of commodity futures, see CeCAGO
MERCANTME EXCHANGE, TRADING mn ToMMoRnows (1970); A. LTrLE, FINANCIAL FuTuRES
HEDGING GumE (1979) [hereinafter cited as LITTLE]. For a discussion of institutional use of
the futures market, see Loosigian, Institutional Use of Financial Futures (Oct. 24, 1979)
(published as part of the Financial Futures Conference of 1979); Teberg, Options and Fi-
nancial Futures, 12 Rav. SEC. REG. 1 (1979); Little, The Two Edged Sword: Using Financial
Futures for Risk Aversion or Risk Taking, PENSIONS AND INVEsTMENTs, August 13, 1979, at
25.
, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-48 (1976 & Supp. II 1979).
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tures contracts.'
Each futures transaction is cleared daily and the clearing house affili-
ated with the particular exchange is interposed as the seller to each buyer
and the buyer to each seller. The clearance process is intended to add an
element of protection for buyers and sellers of futures contracts because
at the end of the day each trader holds a contract with the clearing house,
and does not have to depend on the creditworthiness of the trader with
whom the trade was initially executed.
Participants in the futures market do not normally intend to make or
take delivery of the commodities underlying the contracts. Instead, they
usually intend to offset their outstanding positions prior to the delivery
dates by taking opposite positions in identical contracts. Thus, a trader
who in June purchases ("goes long") a futures contract covering
$1,000,000 face amount of Treasury Bills for delivery in September will
typically settle his contract prior to the September delivery date by sell-
ing ("going short") an identical contract. The short position offsets the
long position, thereby liquidating the trader's contract. Consequently, the
trader avoids the necessity of making or taking delivery of Treasury
Bills.9
When a futures contract is purchased or sold, the customer must pay
"initial margin" to the Futures Commission Merchant (FCM) who han-
dles his trading account.10 The required minimum margin level for each
futures contract traded on an exchange is set by that exchange. In gen-
eral, these amounts vary according to the volatility of the particular com-
modity. After the initial margin has been paid, and the commodity fu-
tures position established, the trader is subject to the daily calculation of
"variation margin" with respect to his contract. If the contract declines in
value, the amount of the decline will be withdrawn from his account on a
daily basis. The customer will not have to restore the margin account to
its initial balance until withdrawals have reduced the margin account be-
low a predetermined portion of the initial balance, referred to as the
"maintenance margin" level.1 ' If the amount in the margin account drops
8 Id. § 4.
9 The opportunity for gain, or the risk of loss, in trading commodity futures contracts
comes from the increase or decrease in the value of the contract during the period between
the date the contract was entered into and the liquidation date. If a contract for the Sep-
tember delivery of Treasury Bills is worth $960,000 in June when the trader goes long, the
value of the contract may increase to $980,000 in August, in which case the trader can settle
out with a gain of $20,000 by going short one identical contract at that time. By the same
token, if the September contract is worth only $940,000 in August, the trader will realize a
$20,000 loss if he goes short to settle out.
10 For most exchanges there are two types of initial margin. The clearing house sets
initial margin requirements for its members. These requirements may differ from the initial
margin requirements set by the exchange for customer accounts. Also, margin requirements
may differ between hedge and speculative accounts.
11 "Maintenance margin" may be set at the initial margin level by an exchange. In such
case, a margin call would be made after any decline in the value of a contract, unless previ-
ously realized profits were left in the margin account and were sufficient to cover the
1980]
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below this level, the FCM will make a margin call and the customer will
be required to restore the margin to its initial amount. If the value of a
customer's contract increases, the profit is credited to that customer's ac-
count. Exchange rules permit traders to withdraw at their discretion
amounts in the margin account in excess of the initial margin. However,
FCMs often impose initial margin requirements on customers that are
higher than exchange requirements. Accordingly, the FCM may call for
additional margin over and above the amount required by exchange rules.
The extra margin required by the FCM may vary from customer to cus-
tomer depending upon the size and nature of the particular customer's
account.
Margin trading in a commodity futures context does not mean the
same thing as buying securities "on margin", which involves a loan by a
broker to an investor for the immediate acquisition of a security.12 Initial
margin in the commodity futures context is "earnest money." It is an at-
tempt to protect the clearing house, the exchange members, and the mar-
ket generally by requiring the initial commitment of money from each
market participant. If the market moves adversely to a participant, the
margin insures that there will be sufficient funds on hand so that, if varia-
tion margin is not paid promptly, there is time to liquidate the partici-
pant's position without the exchange member, clearing house, or FCM
having to use its own funds to pay the deficit. This is why margin levels
are generally reflective of market volatility.
B. Examples of Hedging
1. Short Hedge
One example of how an institutional investor, such as an employee
benefit plan, might employ commodity futures in its overall investment
strategy is the conventional short hedge. In a short hedge, an investor
holding financial instruments seeks to protect current portfolio values
against an anticipated rise in interest rates and decline in prices.
Assume that on January 1 Investor X holds a portfolio of $1,000,000
of Government National Mortgage Association pass-through securities
amount of the margin call.
12 [To] equate commodities margins with securities margins is to misunderstand
the role margin plays in the commodities industry ... In the securities market,
margin represents a down-payment for securities purchased on credit. In the com-
modities industry, margin is not a down-payment. The purchaser or seller of a
futures contract is not buying or selling the underlying commodity. Margin is
merely the earnest money which is put up in order to trade contracts, as opposed
to the commodity itself. Most contracts are liquidated before it actually comes
time to buy or sell the underlying commodity.
The margin, or up-front money, is used simply to assure that a customer is able
to pay for the losses that might occur during the trading on a particular day.
Russo, The Markets Worked as They Should Have, N.Y. Times, April 27, 1980, § 3, at 18,
col 2; see text accompanying note 118 infra.
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(GNMAs) with an 8% coupon and that it plans to sell the GNMAs in
June. The current price for 8% GNMAs is 98-00 (i.e., 98.00%, for a yield
of 8.23%) and Investor X anticipates a rise in interest rates over the next
several months. In order to avoid erosion of the value of this portion of its
portfolio, Investor X sells 10 GNMA futures contracts on an exchange at
a price of 97-00 (i.e., 97.00%, for a yield of 8.37%). Each contract covers
$100,000 principal amount of 8% GNMAs.15
Assume that interest rates rise as Investor X anticipated and that on
June 1 the price for 8% GNMAs is 93-00 (i.e., 93.00%, for a yield of
8.95%). Investor X sells the $1,000,000 of GNMAs at that price for a loss
of $50,000 since January 1,14 and closes out its hedge by purchasing 10
GNMA futures contracts at a price of 92-00 (i.e., 92.00%, for a yield of
9.11%). This purchase offsets its January 1 sale and takes the trader out
of the futures market. X's profit is $50,00015 and it has protected its port-
folio from a decrease in value created by the rise in interest rates foreseen
in January.
If interest rates decline, however, the appreciation of Investor X's
GNMA portfolio would be offset by a loss in its futures position. By en-
tering into a short hedge in January Investor X in effect decides to forego
the possibility of portfolio appreciation due to a decline in interest rates
in order to protect against an anticipated interest rate increase.
2. Long Hedge
A second example of how an employee benefit plan or other institu-
tional investor might use commodity futures is the long hedge. In a long
hedge, an investor in financial instruments seeks to protect a planned fu-
ture investment against an anticipated decline in interest rates.
Assume that on January 1 Investor Y knows that on June 1 it will
receive about $1,000,000 which it would then invest in intermediate term
U.S. Treasury Notes or comparable instruments. The current price of 5-
year 8% Treasury Notes is 96-00 (i.e., 96.00%, for a yield of 9.01%) and
Investor Y anticipates a decline in interest rates over the next several
months. In order to "lock in" the current yield for the planned June in-
vestment in Treasury Notes, Investor Y buys 10 Treasury Note futures
contracts on January 1 at a price of 95-16 (i.e., 95.50%, for a yield of
9.14%). Each contract covers $100,000 principal amount of 4-6 year 8%
Treasury Notes.
Assume that interest rates decline as Investor Y anticipated and that
on June 1, when it receives $1,000,000 for investment, the price of 5-year
13 GNMA certificates including coupons higher and lower than the designated 8% rate
may be delivered with the proper adjustments.
14 Investor X owned GNMAs worth $980,000 on January 1 and sold them on June 1 for
$930,000.
1" Investor X purchased each contract at 92-00 and sold it at 97-00, for a profit of
$5,000. For 10 contracts the aggregate profit is $50,000, excluding commission and margin
costs.
19801
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8% Treasury Notes is 100-00 (i.e., 100%, for a yield of 8.00%). Investor Y
purchases $1,000,000 of 5-year 8% Treasury Notes with the funds re-
ceived and sells 10 Treasury Note futures contracts at a price of 99-16
(i.e., 99.50%, for a yield of 8.12%). This sale offsets the January 1
purchase and takes Investor Y out of the futures market with a realized
profit of $40,000.10 Thus, Investor Y has a real cost of $960,000 for the
Treasury Notes ($1,000,000 purchase price less $40,000 profit on the fu-
tures transaction) and its yield on the Notes is 9.01%, exactly the rate it
was attempting to "lock in" in January.
If interest rates increase, however, Investor Y's reduced cost for
$1,000,000 of Treasury Notes would be offset by a loss on the futures
position. The effective yield would continue to be 9.01%. By entering into
a long hedge in January Investor Y in effect decides to forego the advan-
tage of any possible increase in interest rates by June in order to protect
against an anticipated interest rate decline.
C. The Uses of Futures Contracts for Institutional Investors
Hedging, taking a position in the futures market which is thought to
be the opposite of one's actual or anticipated position in a "cash commod-
ity"," ' is the most attractive use of the futures market for institutional
investors such as employee plans. By effective hedging with commodity
futures a plan can limit its risk in the "cash market.", A hedge can lock
in, or fix, an approximate yield on cash market investments at the rela-
tively modest cost of posting and maintaining margin.
To an employee plan whose portfolio is heavily invested in debt secur-
ities, the fact that hedging will place an upper limit on gains is acceptable
because the investor is by hypothesis primarily interested in the stability
of the interim yield, and preservation of the value of the corpus of the
portfolio. Hedging can also add liquidity and make the portfolio more
flexible. If cash market losses are offset by futures market gains, the plan
can more easily afford to realize cash market losses if, for example, it feels
compelled to liquidate some of its debt holdings to meet benefit payments
or to capitalize on investment opportunities.
For a plan whose portfolio emphasizes capital appreciation through
investment in equities the fact that hedging reduces the potential for
gains may be a significant drawback. However, while the manager of a
11 Investor Y purchased each contract at 95-16 and later sold it at 99-16, for a profit of
$4,000. For 10 contracts the aggregate profit is $40,000, excluding commission and margin
costs.
17 "Cash commodity" means an actual commodity (e.g., a portfolio of Treasury Notes)
rather than a commodity futures contract, forward contract, or option covering the
commodity.
's A "cash market" or "spot market" transaction is one where delivery of the cash com-
modity is made immediately or within a few days of the trade date. The term "cash market"
is distinguishable from the terms "futures market" or "forward market," where delivery of
the commodity may not be made for a substantial period.
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portfolio which emphasizes equities might believe it inadvisable to hedge
by taking equal and exactly opposite positions in the futures market, it
eventually may be considered imprudent1 9 not to employ hedging to some
degree, in order to limit the greater risk inherent in an equity oriented
portfolio.20
Another investment technique which resembles a hedge is a simple
transaction to lock in a future price. A plan which anticipates the need to
buy or sell a commodity traded on a futures exchange can lock in its price
by buying or selling a futures contract. For example, Investor Y in the
long hedge example given above21 could accept delivery of the Treasury
Notes at the maturity of the futures contract, rather than closing out its
futures position and purchasing the Notes in the cash market.
An investor may choose to speculate in futures.22 Speculation provides
the opportunity for significant gains with a relatively small cash commit-
ment. For legal reasons discussed below,23 and perhaps for sound invest-
ment reasons as well, speculation should be carefully controlled and in
most cases limited to a small portion of a plan's portfolio. The complexity
of effective speculation in the futures market and legal restrictions on in-
vestments by fiduciaries, such as the requirement that plan assets be in-
vested prudently, may cause speculative activity to be limited to those
plans which are very large and have the ability to develop or retain advis-
ers with expertise in futures trading.24
1 A common theme among those discussing institutional investment in the futures
markets is that it may soon be considered imprudent not to hedge a portfolio at least par-
tially with futures. See, e.g., LrrrLE, supra note 6, at 8; Gurwin, supra note 1, at 100.
,0 A partial hedge of an equity portfolio might consist of perfect hedges (or as near to
perfect hedges as possible) against the investments on the debt side of the portfolio or "im-
perfect" hedges against the equity investments themselves. As an example of the latter, the
plan might hedge consumer industry stocks (which are sensitive to inflationary interest rate
trends) with long positions in precious metals, which would presumably be inversely af-
fected by such trends. Unfortunately, the risk involved in, and the expertise needed for,
hedging increases drastically when the hedge is not a perfect hedge. Thus, a futures market
hedge against an equity asset would be extremely complex and should not be entered into
without expert assistance.
2 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
22 "Speculation" means the purchase or sale of commodity futures for any reason other
than hedging. Hedging, as illustrated by the examples in the text, see text accompanying
notes 13-16 supra, generally may be said to involve either the sale of commodity futures to
protect against a price decline in a commodity or the purchase of commodity futures to
protect against a price increase in a commodity. Hedgers are generally institutions (e.g., an
employee benefit plan) who have on hand or will need to acquire substantial amounts of a
"commodity" and wish to avoid price risk. Under the Commodity Exchange Act, a "com-
modity" includes anything upon which there is a futures contract. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976 &
Supp. II 1979). Speculators assume risk, and seek substantial rewards, by purchasing or
selling commodity futures.
'3 See text accompanying notes 27-53 infra.
2' Some plans can invest in commodity futures without concern as to whether the in-
vestments are considered prudent under Title I of ERISA because Department of Labor
regulations exempt them from the requirements of Title I. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-3(b).
Such plans include certain Individual Retirement Accounts, and certain "Keogh" plans cov-
19801
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Some types of plans may be better suited than others for speculation
in futures. An individual account plan, such as a profit sharing plan, can
give participants the opportunity to direct that the amounts in their ac-
counts be invested in one or more funds, each fund having a different
investment objective. If the sponsor of such a plan creates a futures fund,
the manager of that fund could speculate in futures instead of using the
futures market for risk management.2 5 Although such a plan design might
not be advisable in many cases, it could be desirable for plans wishing to
provide tax deferred high yield investments to employees in addition to a




A major stumbling block to employee plan investment in commodity
futures has been the prudence requirement of ERISA.17 This require-
ment, which applies to the investment conduct of plan fiduciaries, is set
forth in section 404(a)(1)(B) of ERISA. The section states that a fiduciary
must discharge his duties with respect to a plan
with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circum-
stances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capac-
ity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims.... 2
Although a federal prudence requirement applicable specifically to the
investment of employee plan funds was not codified until the passage of
ERISA, various forms of a prudent man rule have existed in the United
States since at least 1830 as a part of state law relating to fiduciary con-
ering only owner employees. However, such plans would have to contend with IRS invest-
ment standards. See text accompanying notes 47-52 infra. Such plans might also be subject
to the Unrelated Business Income Tax. See text accompanying notes 89-105 infra.
11 If the sponsor of a plan creates a futures fund, the fund manager may enjoy a degree
of insulation from the potential application of the prudence rule, since he would not be
responsible for the decision to invest in futures. The direction to so invest would have come
from the participants. See ERISA § 404(c). However, the fund manager will not be pro-
tected unless "a broad range of investments" is made available to participants. CONF. REP.
No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 305, reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 466 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as CONFERENCE REPORT].
26 Plans which speculate in the commodities markets risk a tax on unrelated business
income, or conceivably disqualification if the IRS takes the position that retirement income
or profit-sharing is no longer the purpose of the plan. See text accompanying notes 89-105
infra.
17 See Gray, The Major Shortfall of ERISA, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., Jan-Feb., 1977, at
18. For an exhaustive treatment of the issue of prudence under ERISA, see R. MURPHY, R.
POSNER, W. CHADWICK, R. MURRAY, R. MiLNE, S. S~mIT, W. GRAY, & R. BLIXT, EVOLVING
CONCErS OF PRUDENCE: THE CHANGING REsPONsmR.rrEs OF THE INVESTMENT FIDUCIARY IN
THE AGE OF ERISA (1976).
-8 ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B).
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duct.2 9 Thus, a prudence requirement generally was applicable to
fiduciaries of employee benefit plans prior to ERISA. Furthermore, as
discussed below, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) long has taken the
position that adherence to a prudent man standard is a requirement for
tax qualification of employee plans.8 0
Historically, courts applied the prudence requirement to each individ-
ual investment made by a fiduciary."8 The fact that a plan trust's portfo-
lio performed reasonably well overall might not have protected a fiduciary
from liability for losses on one or more individual imprudent investments.
The concept of balancing a trust portfolio's investments with certain high
risk and/or negatively covariant investments,"2 practices presently associ-
2' [A trustee must] observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence man-
age their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent
disposition of their funds, considering the probable safety of the capital to be
invested.
Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830). The ERISA prudence stan-
dard originally was thought to establish a more severe test than the common law because of
its apparent emphasis upon a "prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters" and an "enterprise of a like character," instead of a "prudent man" managing his
own affairs. The publication of the Labor Department prudence regulation, see note 36 in-
fra, has to some extent dispelled this fear.
30 See text accompanying notes 47-52 infra.
sl See, e.g., Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 356, 175 N.E. 761, 764 (1931). The pru-
dence rule originally was stated as a right in the cestui que trust to accept or challenge some
of the trustee's investments without having to accept or reject the entire portfolio. King v.
Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 90-91 (1869).
Most cases have until recently taken a rather simplistic approach to the question of
whether a given investment was imprudent. These courts viewed the prudence of an invest-
ment as a function of the risk of that investment. Thus, an investment which was subject to
significant fluctuation was considered less prudent than an investment with a fixed principal
value. This approach led in most states, as well as under the federal banking laws, to the
creation of "legal lists" dictating the acceptable investments for trustees. These legal lists
primarily are based on considerations of ultimate risk of the investment. The Department of
Labor noted, in the preamble to the "prudence" regulation, that risk should not be the only
determining factor in considering whether an investment is or is not prudent
The Department is of the opinion that (1) generally, the relative riskiness of a
specific investment or investment course of action does not render such invest-
ment or such investment course of action either per se prudent or per se impru-
dent, and (2) the prudence of an investment decision should not be judged with-
out regard to the role that the proposed investment or investment course of action
plays within the overall plan portfolio.
44 Fed. Reg. 37, 221-22 (1979) (Supplementary Information to Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 2550.
404a-1) [hereinafter cited as Supplementary Information]. It is for this reason that the De-
partment specifically rejected the possiblity of adopting a legal list approach to employee
plan investment-
[Tihe Department does not consider it appropriate to include in the regulation
any list of investments, classes of investment, or investment techniques that might
be permissible under the 'prudence' rule. No such list could be complete; more-
over, the Department does not intend to create or suggest a 'legal list' of invest-
ments for plan fiduciaries.
Id. at 37, 225.
3 Covariance can be understood as the performance relationship of two separate in-
1980]
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ated with the portfolio theory of investment, 3 was not available to plan
fiduciaries.
3 '
1. Labor Department Regulation
Fortunately, the new Department of Labor regulation interpreting the
prudent man rule of ERISA embraces the concept of testing individual
transactions in light of the overall investment strategy and investment
conduct of the plan's fiduciaries. In this and several other respects, the
regulation is an intentional departure from traditional common law con-
cepts." The prudence regulation states that the requirements of section
404(a)(1)(B) of ERISA are satisfied if the fiduciary, with respect to each
investment, has given "appropriate consideration" to the facts and cir-
cumstances of the investment including the role of the investment in the
"plan's investment portfolio," and has acted accordingly.3 6 The regulation
defines appropriate consideration as including
a determination by the fiduciary that the particular investment or
investment course of action is reasonably designed, as part of the
plan portfolio with respect to which the fiduciary has investment
duties, to further the purposes of the plan, taking into considera-
tion the risk of loss and the opportunity for gain (or other return)
associated with the investment or investment course of
action .... 7
If the ratio of risk to gain on a particular investment is reasonable in
relation to the overall ratio of risk to gain for the portfolio, the individual
vestments. If the relationship between two investments is such that when the value of the
first increases there is a corresponding increase in the value of the second, the two invest-
ments are considered to be positively covariant. Conversely, if a gain on the first investment
is usually matched by a loss on the second, the two investments are considered negatively
covariant. The two investments do not need to bear any other relationship to each other in
order to be treated as covariant or negatively covariant. That is to say, there does not have
to be a direct economic link between the two investments in order for them to be treated as
covariant or negatively covariant. Furthermore, the degree of corresponding gain or loss
does not have to be equivalent; the relative gain or loss merely affects the degree of covari-
ance or negative covariance. See generally Johnston, PRUDENCE IN TRUST INVESTMENT, 8
MICH. J. L. REF. 491, 508 (1975).
See A. AMLING, INVESTMENTs: AN INTRODUCTION TO ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT (4th
ed. 1975). For an example of portfolio theory applied by one pension plan, see Derven, In-
ternational Paper: Letting the Chips Fall, 15 PENSION WORLD 16 (1979).
3 See Bank of New York v. Spitzer, 43 A.D.2d 105, 108, 349 N.Y.S.2d 747, 750 (1st
Dep't 1973), aff'd, 35 N.Y.2d 512, 323 N.E.2d 700, 364 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1974).
35 The legislative history of [ERISA] indicates that the common law of trusts,
which forms the basis for and is federalized and codified in part 4 of Title I of
[ERISA], should, nevertheless, not be mechanically applied to employee benefit
plans. The 'prudence' rule in [ERISA] sets forth a standard built upon, but that
should and does depart from, traditional trust law in certain respects.
Supplementary Information, supra note 31, at 37,221, 37,222 (footnote omitted).
6 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b)(1) (1979).
- 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b)(2)(i) (1979).
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investment can be treated as prudent although it might be considered a
high risk investment if viewed independently.
The definition of appropriate consideration also includes consideration
of the diversification, liquidity, and investment return needs of the plan."
Thus, a plan fiduciary can and should take factors other than gain into
account in judging the value of an investment. For example, many portfo-
lios contain investments which supply needed liquidity to a plan even
though those investments reduce the overall gain of the portfolio.$9
A hedging strategy has an objective similar to diversification. The
principal aim of diversification, at least in an ERISA context, is to insu-
late the overall portfolio from the risk of loss attaching to a particular
investment by making a variety of investments such that, with respect to
each, the risk of loss is thought to arise from largely independent factors,
that is investments which are not covariant.40 Hedging an investment
goes beyond merely purchasing an investment with independent risk fac-
tors. It seeks an investment with a negative covariance to an existing (or
planned) investment, so that those market forces which would produce a
loss on the prospective investment would generally produce a gain on the
existing investment, and vice versa. Thus, although using futures as part
of a hedging strategy offsets the opportunity for gain on another portion
of the portfolio, it provides an efficient way of achieving the minimization
of covariance that is the primary aim of diversifying a portfolio.
2. The Need for Proper Authority and Trading Guidelines
The prudence regulation does not take a position on whether a partic-
ular investment or investment strategy, such as the use of commodity fu-
tures, is or is not prudent. Furthermore, although the regulation is in-
tended to provide a "safe harbor,"4 1 its deliberate generality will not
" Id. The Department of Labor believes a fiduciary should take into consideration "the
composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification." Id. While diversification is an
element of appropriate consideration for purposes of the definition of prudent conduct, it is
also a separate requirement under § 404(a)(1)(C) of ERISA.
39The recognition of valid criteria other than opportunity for gain is as important as
the regulation's focus on overall portfolio investment. A prudence standard based only on
the concept of gains, even if applied in the context of the entire portfolio, might be violated
by hedging transactions.
'" The Labor Department states that "the word 'diversification' is to be given its cus-
tomary meaning as a mechanism for reducing the risk of large losses.... ." Supplementary
Information, supra note 31, at 37,223. In a non-ERISA context, diversification can relate to
gains as well as losses. That is, a diversified portfolio may have the aim of taking adVantage
of potential windfalls as well as avoiding large losses from over-commitments.
41 It should also be noted that the Department does not view compliance with the
provisions of the regulation as necessarily constituting the exclusive method for
satisfying the requirements of the 'prudence' rule. Rather, the regulation is in the
nature of a 'safe harbor' provision; it is the opinion of the Department that
fiduciaries who comply with the provisions of the regulation will have satisfied the
requirements of the 'prudence' rule, but no opinion is expressed in the regulation
as to the status of activities undertaken or performed that do not so comply.
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allow a fiduciary to avoid the possibility of liability through mechanical
compliance with a set of objective standards. Thus, before authorizing or
implementing any non-traditional investment conduct, such as the use of
commodity futures, a fiduciary with any degree of investment discretion
should carefully consider not only the substance of the Labor Depart-
ment's position on prudent investments, but also more traditional con-
cepts of prudent fiduciary conduct, such as proper authorization and the
establishment of documented investment guidelines.
The plan or trust instrument should authorize futures trading.42 The
authorization should be broad enough to cover all contemplated invest-
ments but sufficiently specific to preclude those that are not contem-
plated. 3 At the same time authorization is given, the fiduciary charged
with overall plan investment responsibility should document the reasons
for and the goals of futures trading. Guidelines should be developed spec-
ifying the limits on the amount of plan assets committed to futures trad-
ing, taking into account the likelihood of margin calls. There should be
provision for a periodic review of trading and its effect on the overall
portfolio. If the plan is to use futures to hedge cash market investments,
the guidelines must provide for coordination between the futures trading
Supplementary Information, supra note 31, at 37,222.
' The common law of trusts would require authorization of futures trading:
Unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, the following are
not proper trust investments: (1) purchase of securities for purposes of specula-
tion, for example, purchase of shares of stock on margin or purchase of bonds
selling at a great discount because of uncertainty whether they will be paid on
maturity-, (2) purchase of securities in new and untried enterprises; (3) employ-
ment of trust property in the carrying on of trade or business; (4) purchase of land
or other things for resale.
RFsTATE ENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 227, Comment f (1959) [hereinafter cited as TRusT
RESTATEMENT] (emphasis added).
The role of common law in interpreting the fiduciary rules of ERISA is still open to
consideration. The common law rule is inherent in the trust requirement of ERISA § 403.
"In developing a law of remedies [under ERISA], the Congress intended the federal courts
to draw on principles of traditional trust law. . . . " Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 462 (10th
Cir. 1978) (citing 120 CONG. REC. 15,737 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams) reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5186). See also CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note
25, at 306. Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the potential
importance of common law. Iron Wlkrs. Local 272 v. Bowen, No. 78-1789, slip op. at 8817
(5th Cir. Aug. 25, 1980). For tax-qualified plans, there is a general rule that all investments
must be permitted by the trust agreement. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(5)(i) (1976). For na-
tional banks acting as trustees, there is a similar requirement set forth in regulations of the
Comptroller of the Currency. See note 130 infra.
43 The authorization in invest in commodity futures should not be written so broadly as
to approve all speculative or innovative investment. In Revenue Ruling 73-532, 1973-2 C.B.
128, the IRS held that a trust forming part of a plan which states that "the trustee shall
have complete power to invest trust funds without regard to whether invesments may be
new, speculative, hazardous, adventurous, or productive of income... " would not consti-
tute a qualified trust for purposes of the Code. The reason for disqualification was that the
language would allow the trustee to ignore the exclusive benefit requirement of § 401(a)(2)
of the Code. See text accompanying notes 47-52 infra.
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and the hedged investments. 4"
Taking these steps before engaging in futures trading not only insures
that those with potential liability under ERISA perform a thorough anal-
ysis in keeping with the prudence regulation and traditional concepts of
prudent conduct, but also provides evidence that this analysis has taken
place. The importance of both the analysis and evidence of the analysis
cannot be over-emphasized. The risk of loss, varying to some degree with
the variety of futures contract to be traded, can be quite substantial.
While stop-loss limits should enable a trader to realize and stop its
loss on any given day,4 5 it is possible in rare cases for the market to "go
the limit" every day for many days even though no trading takes place. If
no one is willing to take an opposite position within the price limit set for
the particular day, a trader may be unable to stop its losses because the
contract cannot be closed out.46
3. IRS Investment Requisites
The prudent conduct requirement of section 404 of ERISA applies to
almost all employee benefit plans covered by Title I of that Act. However,
tax-qualified plans47 may also be subject to investment requisites, includ-
ing a prudence requirement, derived by the IRS from the tax-qualifica-
tion requirements of section 401 of the Code.
Section 401(a) of the Code states that a trust will be a qualified trust
44 The need in some situations for coordination among fiduciaries managing separate
portions of a plan's portfolio may have been overlooked by the Department of Labor, which
states in the preamble to the prudence regulation that:
[P]aragraph (b)(1) of the regulations adopted also provides that such a fiduciary
need give appropriate consideration to the role the proposed investment or rein-
vestment course of action plays in that portion only, of the plan's investment
portfolio, with respect to which the fiduciary has investment duties.
Supplementary Information, supra note 31, at 37,223. Hedging through futures by definition
involves coordination with at least a portion of a plan's cash position investments, some of
which may be under the control of another fiduciary.
. Exchanges set limits on how far up or down the price of a commodity can move on a
particular day. If the price reaches the limit, further trading is suspended except at prices
equal to or within the limits. Thus, on a day when silver for delivery 3 months in the future
opens at $17 an ounce the limits on trading may be set at $18 per ounce and $16 an ounce,
and no trading could then take place at prices exceeding $18 or less than $16.
4 Even if a contract cannot be closed out, there are complex trading techniques which
may permit the investor in this circumstance to liquidate his futures position. These tech-
niques rely on the use of spreads, which involve taking long and short "positions" in differ-
ent months in the same commodity, and on the fact that, with certain exceptions, there are
no price limits applicable to futures trading in the "spot" (or nearest) month.
41 A trust forming part of an employee benefit plan which satisfies the requirements of
§ 401 of the Code is exempt from taxation under I.R.C. § 501. Employer contributions to
such a trust are deductible and are not currently taxable to employees. Similar tax benefits
are afforded to non-trusteed annuity plans which meet the requirements of § 403 of the
Code. With the exception of certain unfunded plans providing deferred compensation, usu-
ally for highly paid executives, virtually all employee retirement plans seek to maintain tax-
qualified status under LRC. § 401.
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under that section if it is "part of a stock bonus, pension, or profit-shar-
ing plan of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his employees or their
beneficiaries. . . . " Although section 1.401-1(b)(5)(i) of the Income Tax
Regulations provides that contributions to a trust forming part of a quali-
fied plan may be used to purchase any investment permitted by the trust
agreement and allowed by local law, the IRS has said that the primary
purpose of benefiting employees must be maintained with respect to in-
vestments of the trust funds. 48 The IRS has further said that an invest-
ment is consistent with the exclusive benefit requirement if it meets cer-
tain "applicable investment requisites":
(1) The cost must not exceed fair market value at the time of
purchase, (2) a fair return commensurate with the prevailing rate
must be provided, (3) sufficient liquidity must be maintained to
permit distributions in accordance with the terms of the plan,
and (4) the safeguards and diversity that a prudent investor
would adhere to must be present.4
9
The IRS investment requisites are applied on an investment-by-in-
vestment basis, and contain their own prudence rule in the fourth re-
quirement. The extent to which these requisites still have vitality is un-
clear,50 but if they do, plans would encounter difficulties in justifying any
transaction in the futures market, including a hedge.51
" Rev. Rul. 73-380, 1973-2 C.B. 124.
" IRS Pub. 778 (2-72), replacing Rev. Rul. 69-421, 1969-1 C.B. 59. See also, Rev. Rul.
73-532, 1973-2 C.B. 128; Rev. Rul. 73-380, 1973-2 C.B. 124.
50 Under the Internal Revenue Code, qualified retirement plans must be for the
exclusive benefit of the employees and their beneficiaries. Following this require-
ment, the [IRS] has developed general rules that govern the investment of plan
assets.... The conferees intend that to the extent that a fiduciary meets the
prudent man rule of the labor provisions, he will be deemed to meet ... the ex-
clusive benefit requirements under the [Code].
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 302. Notwithstanding this explicit statement of the
Conference Committee's intention, the IRS apparently believes that it can continue to regu-
late independently the investments of qualified plans under its authority to insure that such
plans are operated for the exclusive benefit of plan participants. See text accompanying
note 52 infra (discussing Private Letter Ruling 7944001).
5' The Treasury Department's view of speculative investments is clearer with regard to
the investment of private foundation funds than it is with regard to the investment of plan
funds. Section 4944 of the Code places a tax on investments which jeopardize the exempt
function of private foundations, and the IRS has indicated that jeopardizing investments
may well include speculative investments:
(2) Jeopardizing investments.... [A]n investment shall be considered to
jeopardize the carrying out of the exempt purposes of a private foundation if it is
determined that the foundation managers, in making such investment, have failed
to exercise ordinary business care and prudence, under the facts and circum-
stances prevailing at the time of making the investment, in providing for the long-
and short-term financial needs of the foundation to carry out its exempt pur-
poses. ... No category of investments shall be treated as a per se violation of
section 4944. However, the following are examples of types or methods of invest-
ment which will be closely scrutinized to determine whether the foundation man-
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As recently as 1979 the IRS relied on the exclusive benefit rule, as
applied to a particular investment, to disqualify a plan. In Private Letter
Ruling 7944001, the IRS noted that an investment found to be improper
under the investment requisites of the exclusive benefit rule, including
prudence, would disqualify a plan not only in the year in which the trans-
action was entered into, but in every year until the transaction was cor-
rected. Private Letter Ruling 7944001 involved an unsecured loan be-
tween a plan and the employer shortly before the employer became
insolvent, and therefore presents a less sympathetic case than mere trad-
ing in a somewhat novel market such as commodity futures. Nevertheless,
it is significant that since the passage of ERISA, the IRS has relied in at
least one case on its own requirements of prudent investment for tax
qualification purposes."
The broad question of tax qualification is wholly within IRS jurisdic-
tion. Whether or when the IRS will change its views as to the investment
requisites applicable to fiduciaries of qualified plans is not at all clear.
Unless a change is made, however, plans cannot ignore the IRS when
resolving questions of prudence.
4. Conclusion
An employee benefit plan wishing to trade commodity futures can do
so in compliance with the prudence requirement of ERISA. With proper
authorization, written guidelines, and careful attention to individual in-
vestment decisions a fiduciary can justify hedging, and to a lesser degree
speculation, in futures. The IRS investment standards, including pru-
dence, present a continuing problem since they are not as flexible as the
Department of Labor's formulation. In view of the apparently unequivo-
cal legislative history to ERISA,53 it is likely that the IRS ultimately will
be forced to defer to the Department of Labor's standards in its regula-
tion of qualified plans.
agers have met the requisite standard of care and prudence: Trading in securities
on margin, trading in commodity futures, investments in working interests in oil
and gas wells, the purchase of "puts" and "calls," and "straddles," the purchase of
warrants, and selling short.
Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2)(i) (1976) (emphasis added).
This regulation was recently cited by the IRS in ruling that the purchase of certain life
insurance policies by an organization exempt from federal income tax under § 501(c)(3) of
the Code was imprudent and therefore jeopardized the exempt function of the organization.
See Rev. Rul. 80-133, 1980-19 I.R.B. 13.
", [1979] PRivATE Larm RuULNGS (P-H) 2455. Although the IRS pointed out that the
loan at issue in Private Letter Ruling 7944001 constituted a "prohibited transaction" under
the Code and ERISA, it did not feel it necessary to make any reference to the prudence rule
of ERISA. Id.
5 See note 51 supra.
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B. ERISA Trust Considerations
Under section 403 of ERISA, assets of most employee benefit plans
must be held in trust by one or more trustees." Therefore, a plan must
structure its futures trading so as to keep all assets under the exclusive
control of plan trustees.
A proposed Department of Labor regulation defines the term "plan
assets" generally as "all property, tangible or intangible. . . in which the
plan has any beneficial ownership interest. . . . "5 The precise meaning
of "beneficial ownership interest" is not clear and neither the proposed
regulation nor the Supplementary Information thereto provide further
guidance.
1. Futures Contracts
Although it is not clear how broadly the Department of Labor views
the term "beneficial ownership interest," the term easily encompasses di-
rect ownership, such as a plan acquires over a commodity futures con-
tract. Therefore, commodity futures contracts purchased by a plan must
be considered as constituting plan assets and must be held in trust.56
This raises a question whether the indicia of ownership of the contract
can be transferred to the trustee of a plan trading a commodity future. In
the normal case there is no certificate or other indicia of ownership trans-
ferred in connection with the purchase of a commodity futures contract.
57
It may be sufficient for the trustee to be timely notified of the execution
of contracts on the plan's behalf.58 Clearly a good faith attempt at com-
[A]ll assets of an employee plan shall be held in trust by one or more trustees.
Such trustee or trustees shall be either named in the trust instrument or in the
plan instrument or appointed by a person who is a named fiduciary, and upon
acceptance of being named or appointed, the trustee or trustees shall have exclu-
sive authority and discretion to manage and control the assets of the plan....
ERISA § 403(a) (emphasis added). Employee plans funded through the purchase of insur-
ance contracts are not required to have a trustee. ERISA §403(b)(2). However, if plan assets
are held in a separate account of an insurance company, many of the considerations appli-
cable to trusts may apply to the handling of the separate account as well. See ERISA
§ 401(b)(2)(B).
53 Prop. Reg. § 2550.401b-l(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 50,363 (1979), reproposed in part, 45 Fed.
Reg. 38,084 (1980).
" Prop. Reg. § 2550.403a-1, 44 Fed. Reg. 50,363 (1979).
57 The customer directs the FCM to purchase or sell the desired contract and, after
execution, the FCM sends the customer a confirmation of the trade. A commodity futures
trade does not result in any document executed by the parties. Similarly, the liquidation of
a contract will be unaccompanied by any documentation other than the confirmation slip
and subsequent monthly statement of account. Therefore, there is nothing for a plan trustee
to have custody over except the confirmation, which gives the name and quantity of the
commodity, the delivery month and the price. The trustee might store the data evidencing
the transactions engaged in, but it is impossible to hold any document carrying a power of
disposition over the underlying property.
" A footnote to the Supplementary Information to Regulation § 2550.403a-1 states
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pliance with the custody requirement is advisable, and in addition to
monitoring confirmations of trades, the trustee might maintain a ledger
account of all transactions entered into through the FCM.
2. Margin Accounts
The requirement of section 403 that plan assets be held in trust and
be subject to the exclusive control of the plan trustee also raises difficult
questions with respect to initial margin. If margin is a deposit or down
payment it can be argued forcefully that the margin is not an asset of the
plan. However, although the trader does not have complete control over
the disposition of the margin in the hands of the FCM,5 9 the margin is
regarded for purposes of commodities law as owned by the trader. Rules
promulgated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission require
that the margin be held in a segregated account and be treated as owned
by the customer.60 When a contract is closed out, the margin is returned
to the customer. Thus the plan has a substantial ownership interest
which probably constitutes a "beneficial ownership interest" within the
meaning of the proposed plan asset regulation.
One plan apparently has attempted to resolve this problem by depos-
iting the margin in an escrow account with a third party bank acting as
trustee.61 The FCM has access to the escrow account held by the bank
and is able to draw on the account to meet variation margin calls6 2 while
[T]he Department has received inquiries as to whether it is permissible for securi-
ties in which a plan has invested to be registered in the name of a broker-dealer or
the broker-dealer's nominee, sometimes referred to as "street name" registration.
The Department would generally view such a practice under the proposed regula-
tion as violating the requirement of section 403(a) of the Act that plan assets must
be held in trust, except under those circumstances where the broker-dealer holds
the securities as trustee for the plan pursuant to an executed trust agreement.
Supplementary Information, supra note 31, at 50,366 n.14. If commodity futures trading
were analogized to securities trading, the above-quoted language and the literal language of
ERISA § 403 might lead to the conclusion that the trustee must have title to or even cus-
tody of actual contracts. If the footnote means that all securities or at least the title thereto
must be held in the custody of a trustee, there is a serious problem because there is no
certificate or other document which can be viewed as manifesting the contract. However, the
footnote can also be read as being limited in application to the holding of a plan's securities
in the street name of its broker. If this reading is correct, it is possible to argue that provid-
ing the trustee with trade confirmations is sufficient, especially since there is no apparent
practical alternative means of satisfying the statute's requirements.
59 A customer may retain substantial control over the assets in the margin account.
Within limits, the customer can decide what kinds of assets to place in the margin account
and can substitute new assets for those initially placed in the account.
0 Section 4(d)(2) of the Commodity Exchange Act states that margin must be "sepa-
rately accounted for and shall not be commingled with the funds of [the FCM] . . . " and
will otherwise be treated "as belonging to the customers .... "7 U.S.C. § 6(d)(2) (1976 &
Supp. H 1979). CFTC regulations set forth detailed requirements with respect to customer's
money, securities and property. 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.20-1.30 (1979).
" See DuPont Futures, supra note 2.
'2An employee plan trading commodity futures that did not allow the FCM access to
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the money is at the same time arguably held in the plan trust because the
plan trustee also has access to the margin. However, to the extent that
the broker has access to the escrow account, it is difficult to conclude that
the plan trustee has the "exclusive authority and discretion" over those
assets required by section 403 of ERISA. 5
At present there does not appear to be a straightforward solution to
the apparent conflict between section 403 of ERISA and the requirement
that initial margin be in the possession of the FCM. Therefore, as a prac-
tical matter, plans which are to trade futures should make a good faith
attempt to alter the standard arrangements concerning margin accounts
in order to satisfy both rules. In the longer term, however, because both
rules serve valid public policy ends, it is to be hoped that a more direct
solution could be found, perhaps in the Department of Labor's plan asset
regulation." It would be unfortunate if plans were ultimately precluded
from access to the futures markets because of such a technicality.
3. Investment Responsibility
Under section 403 of ERISA only certain fiduciaries of the plan can
exercise managerial discretion over the disposition of the assets.e5 If a
named fiduciary of a plan, such as an employer's in-house investment
the margin account could not truly be said to have created a margin account. Margin is an
essential element of the mechanism of the futures market.
13 If the third-party approach, see text accompanying notes 61 & 62, is used, it is cru-
cial that the margin be maintained for the exclusive benefit of the plan except for margin
calls. Thus, the margin must not be invested for the benefit of the FCM or otherwise dealt
with in a way that might benefit the FCM. Otherwise, ERISA prohibited transaction and
tax qualification problems arise. See text accompanying note 82 infra.
4 The Labor Department's proposed regulation defining plan assets, Prop. Reg. §
2550.401b-l(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 50,363 (1979), reproposed in part, 45 Fed. Reg. 38,084 (1979),
has been opposed strongly by numerous commentators. The definition of plan assets con-
tained in the proposal is extremely broad, and many have argued that the proposal would
create arbitrary and burdensome results. The final regulation may not be published for
some time, as the result of the controversy surrounding the original proposal and the
reproposal.
On September 18, 1980, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith filed a request with the
Department of Labor seeking relief from the effects of the trust requirement of § 403 as it
would apply to a futures margin account. On October 17, the Futures Industry Association
filed a letter with the Department joining in Merrill Lynch's request.
'5 [Ulpon acceptance of being named or appointed, the trustee or trustees shall
have exclusive authority and discretion to manage and control the assets of the
plan, except to the extent that-
(1) the plan expressly provides that the trustee or trustees are subject
to the direction of a named fiduciary who is not a trustee, in which
case the trustees shall be subject to proper directions of such fiduciary
which are made in accordance with the terms of the plan and which
are not contrary to this title, or
(2) authority to manage, acquire, or dispose of assets of the plan is
delegated to one or more investment managers pursuant to section
402(c)(3).
ERISA § 403(a) (emphasis added).
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management committee or the plan's trustee, retains control over all fu-
tures investments, the asset management requirement of section 403 is
satisfied. Section 403 is also satisfied if the plan's assets are invested at
the direction of an investment manager. An investment manager is de-
fined by ERISA as
any fiduciary (other than a trustee or named fiduciary, as defined
in section 402(a)(2)) -
(A) who has the power to manage, acquire, or dispose of any
asset of a plan;
(B) who is (i) registered as an investment adviser under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940... and
(C) has acknowledged in writing that he is a fiduciary with
respect to the plan."6
Such a plan may well decide that it does not have the in-house exper-
tise to trade in commodity futures, and that the plan trustee either lacks
such expertise or is unwilling to make trading decisions with respect to
commodity futures. In these cases, a plan will have to obtain the expert
advice of an FCM or a "commodity trading advisor" (CTA) in order to
participate in the commodities markets.6 7 If the functions of the CTA rise
to the level of exercising discretion over the management or disposition of
the assets of the plan, the CTA will either have to qualify as an invest-
ment manager, be named as a fiduciary in the plan instrument, or be
appointed as a trustee.
In theory it is possible for a CTA to render advice which is often fol-
lowed by someone who actually has ultimate responsibility for investment
decisions, without the CTA having to be a named fiduciary, trustee, or
investment manager. For this to be the case, the CTA cannot have any
real power, formally or effectively, to decide whether to execute the rec-
ommended trades.68 It would be difficult, however, for a plan to derive
- ERISA § 3(38).
67 With certain exceptions, anyone who is engaged for compensation or profit in the
business of advising others directly or indirectly as to the value of commodities or the advis-
ability of trading futures contracts is a "commodity trading advisor" (CTA). 7 U.S.C. § 2
(1976 & Supp. H 1979). An FCM can render investment advice or exercise discretion in
connection with its handling of a discretionary account without being deemed to be a com-
modity trading advisor. 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(bb) (1979). Thus, an FCM would not have to register
as a CTA when managing discretionary accounts. However, such an FCM would be subject
to all of the ERISA problems applicable to CTAs in that circumstance. Thus, the discussion
in the text of the problems of CTAs should be considered to apply as well to FCMs to the
extent they are rendering advice to customers or taking on discretionary control of the in-
vestment of an employee plan customer's account.
Apparently a person can render "investment advice" to a plan without having that
activity rise to the level of authority or discretion requiring appointment as a named fiduci-
ary, trustee, or investment manager. Section 402(c) of ERISA states that:
Any employee benefit plan may provide ... (2) that a named fiduciary, or fiduci-
ary designated by a named fiduciary pursuant to a plan procedure described in
section 405(c)(1), may employ one or more persons to render advice with regard to
1980]
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any benefit from the advice of a CTA without giving the CTA effective
power to implement the advice. Commodity futures trading is typically
conducted rapidly in an active market where, to be effective, trades must
be executed quickly. A plan's management committee cannot convene to
consider each recommendation to buy or sell. A trustee receiving constant
advice could not take the time to analyze that advice and exercise inde-
pendent judgment before following it.
In order to become an investment manager, a CTA must register as an
investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.'s The In-
vestment Advisers Act defines an investment adviser as
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of ad-
vising others, either directly or through publications or writing, as
to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in,
purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as
part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or re-
ports concerning securities . . .70
While commodity futures contracts are not securities, 1 a CTA might be-
come registered as an investment adviser if, in addition to rendering ad-
vice with regard to futures, it offers advice on securities trading. However,
any responsibility such fiduciary has under the plan. ....
Id.
A person rendering investment advice is a fiduciary under Department of Labor regula-
tions, if
[S]uch person renders advice to the plan as to the value of securities or other
property, or makes recommedations as to the advisability of investing in, purchas-
ing, or selling securities or other property; and (ii) Such person either directly or
indirectly. . . [h]as discretionary authority or control, whether or not pursuant to
agreement, arrangement or understanding, with respect to purchasing or selling
securities or other property for the plan; or . . . [r]enders any advice . . . on a
regular basis to the plan pursuant to a mutual agreement, arrangement or under-
standing, written or otherwise, between such person and the plan or a fiduciary
with respect to the plan, that such services will serve as a primary basis for invest-
ment decisions with respect to plan assets, and that such person will render indi-
vidualized investment advice to the plan based on the particular needs of the plan
regarding such matters as, among other things, investment policies or strategy,
overall portfolio composition or diversification of plan investments.
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c) (1980).
6- 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2 to 80b-21.
70 Id. § 80b-2(a)(11) (emphasis added).
1' Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 367
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); see also N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo, REGULATON OF BROKERS,
DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS §§ 1-39 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WOLFSON, PHMLIPS &
Russo]. Whether or not a futures contract on a security is, by itself, a separate security, so
that a CTA trading such futures could be treated as rendering advice with regard to securi-
ties for purposes of the 1940 Act, is an academic question. Futures transactions executed on
an exchange are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC. See Russo & Lyon, The
Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 6 HovSTRA L. REV.
57 (1977). The definition of the term "security" creates other ERISA problems for plans and
members of the futures industry. See text accompanying notes 143-153 infra.
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even if a CTA is registered as an investment adviser, there would remain
a question as to whether the CTA would be regarded as an investment
manager under ERISA when the CTA is acting as a CTA rather than as a
securities investment adviser. It might well be argued that futures trading
is not within the intended scope of the exception for assets managed by
investment managers. However, any advice regarding hedging would, by
definition, go beyond mere advice regarding trading on a commodity ex-
change. Such advice would encompass the relevant portions of the rest of
the plan's portfolio and, in that connection, would be connected so inte-
grally with advice on the disposition of the plan's securities that registra-
tion as an investment advisor should be viewed as appropriate for pur-
poses of section 3(38) of ERISA.
If a CTA cannot or does not want to be an investment manager, it can
exercise authority or discretion over the plan's assets only if appointed as
a named fiduciary or a trustee.72 It does not appear that Congress in-
tended that outside advisers be given discretion over plan assets through
grants of pro forma status as a named fiduciary or trustee.73 The issue
should be clarified by amending section 3(38) or by regulatory relief from
the burden of having to make a CTA a trustee or named fiduciary.
C. ERISA Prohibited Transactions
Sections 406 and 502 of ERISA and section 4975 of the Code impose
severe penalties on "disqualified persons" 7' who engage in "prohibited
transactions"'with employee plans.7 5 The term "disqualified person" in-
7' In order to be a trustee, an FCM or CTA doing business in corporate form would
probably have to have the legal power to function as a trustee under local law. Generally, a
corporation will have the power to act as a trustee of any trust the operation of which is
incidential to the conduct of the corporation's business. See G. BOGFRT, THE LAW OF TRUsTs
AND TRusTmS § 131 (2d ed. 1965); A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 96 (3d ed. 1967). How-
ever, there are some states where a CTA or FCM would not have the power to be a trustee
regardless of the purpose of the trust. Id. The question whether an FCM or CTA has such
power apparently has not been faced in any state.
ERISA might preempt any state law limiting the power of a corporation to act as a
trustee of an employee benefit plan trust. However, a tax-qualified trust must be valid
under local law. LR.S. Pub. 778, Part 2 § f (2-72). Thus, the power to act as trustee under
state laws will continue to be an important consideration when trading with assets of tax-
qualified plans.
11 ERISA § 405 specifically provides for retaining outside fiduciaries as advisers but
distinguishes between such advisory functions and actual authority over disposition of plan
assets, which must stay with the trustee or the named fiduciary. ERISA § 405(c)(1)(B). The
legislative history appears to contemplate that, when trustee responsibility is given to.
named fiduciaries, the named fiduciaries will not be outsiders such as investment specialists,
but insiders such as an investment committee made up of employees of the sponsor. See
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 298.
" The persons who are restricted in their dealings with plans are referred to as "parties
in interest" under §§ 406 and 502 of ERISA and "disqualified persons" under § 4975 of the
Code. Since both terms are essentially the same, for these purposes we will hereinafter use
only the term disqualified persons.
75 There are three kinds of sanctions for engaging in prohibited transactions. If the
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cludes anyone who provides services to an employee benefit plan and any-
one who is a fiduciary of a plan. By performing commodity futures trad-
ing functions on behalf of a plan investing in futures, an FCM inevitably
will become a disqualified person with regard to that plan on the basis of
the services provided. Furthermore, if the FCM goes beyond mere admin-
istrative functions and begins to recommend purchases, the FCM will run
the risk of being treated as a fiduciary as well.7 6 Thus, both the FCM and
the employee plan should analyze whether or not their relationship, and
the transactions they engage in, create a possibility that the plan and the
FCM will violate the prohibitied transaction rules.
Prohibited transactions can be divided into two categories: a broad
range of transactions which all disqualified persons are prohibited from
engaging in, and a smaller group of transactions involving conflicts of in-
terests which apply only to fiduciaries.
1. General Prohibited Transactions
The broad set of prohibitions against transactions between any dis-
qualified person and a plan applies to transactions which involve the ex-
change of money or other property, with the exception of reasonable com-
pensation for services, between disqualified persons and a plan. Other
prohibited transactions include the provision of more than one service be-
tween a disqualified person and a plan, and the extension of credit be-
tween a disqualified person and a plan.
7 7
The prohibition against multiple services may create an obstacle to
certain FCM activities. Typically, an FCM will perform multiple func-
tions; the FCM may execute trades on behalf of the plan and may also
provide reporting and research functions for the plan. Depending upon
the circumstances, the several functions might be definable as a single
service for purposes of avoiding the prohibition against multiple services.
Even if the FCM is considered to be providing multiple services, those
services might be permitted under ERISA section 408(b)(2) and Code
section 4975(d)(2) and regulations thereunder which exempt arrange-
prohibited transaction results in loss to the employee benefit plan, a fiduciary involved in
the transaction is liable for damages under ERISA § 409. Those who are involved in a pro-
hibited transaction are all subject to equitable relief and can be forced to rescind the
transaction.
Disqualified persons are liable for an excise tax levied, in the case of qualified plans,
under § 4975 of the Code. The excise tax is 5% of the "amount involved" in the prohibited
transaction, unless the transaction is not "corrected within ninety days after the IRS asserts
a tax deficiency," in which case an excise tax of 100% is levied. The Department of Labor
has authority to assess similar civil penalties under § 502(i) of ERISA with respect to non-
qualified plans. However, the plan itself is never liable for damages, excise taxes or penalty
fees under the prohibited transaction provisions of the Code and ERISA.
71 If an FCM gives advice on trading in addition to the other services provided by the
FCM, and if the FCM knows that its advice will be followed, it is quite likely that the FCM
will be treated as a fiduciary. See ERISA § 3(21); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3(21) (1979).
7 ERISA § 406(a); I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(A)-(D).
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ments for additional services that are necessary to the operation of the
plan. 8 The term "necessary to the operation of the plan" is interpreted
broadly in the regulations and should cover the services involved in exe-
cuting a program of commodity futures trades.79 Because the relationship
between the plan and FCM can vary, that relationship should always be
compared with the requirements of the regulation in order to make sure
that the exemption applies. The relationship should be reviewed periodi-
cally to make certain that it has not evolved beyond the boundaries of the
exemption.
The prohibition against the transfer of assets and the prohibition
against the extension of credit create more difficult problems. Compensa-
tion paid to the FCM for services will not be prohibited per se unless the
amount is unreasonable.80 However, the margin may be treated as a plan
asset, as described above in the discussion of ERISA trust requirements.8 1
In that case, unless the margin is invested for the benefit of the trader,
the placing of a margin account with the FCM could be treated as a
transfer of money, a transfer of the use of money, or a extension of
credit 82 to the FCM.
In the usual case, the question of who receives the benefit of invest-
ment of the margin will be subject to negotiation between the FCM and
the trader. However, if the margin is a plan asset, and if the benefit of
interim investment of the margin inures to the FCM or another party in
interest, a prohibited transaction may occur under ERISA section 406
and Code section 4975. Tax qualification problems may also arise under
the requirement of section 401 of the Code that all assets be held for the
exclusive benefit of employees or their beneficiaries. 83 Thus, the income
on the investment of the margin should always inure to the benefit of the
plan. This problem may be solved if the margin is determined not to be a
plan asset by the Department of Labor,8' or if some other form of admin-
78 Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(a) (1977); see also ERISA § 408(b)(2); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408(b)(2) (1979) (non-tax qualified plans).
79 Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(a) (1977).
80 ERISA § 408(b)(2); I.R.C. § 4975(d)(2).
81 See text accompanying notes 54-64 supra.
8 LR.C. §§ 4975(c)(1)(B) & (D); ERISA §§ 406(a)(1)(B) & (D). "Margin" buying of
commodity futures should not be considered an extension of credit to the plan as it would
be in a securities context. See note 71 supra.
" If the margin is a plan asset and the benefit of the interim investment of the margin
inures to a party in interest, these events could be considered as either an extension of
credit under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(B) and I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(B), or a transfer of assets for the
use of a disqualified person under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(D) and LR.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D). Use of
the "float" on the margin for the benefit of the FCM could also result in a violation of the
exclusive benefit rule of I.R.C. § 401(a)(2). See text accompanying note 61 supra.
The Department of Labor's proposed regulation defining plan assets would appar-
ently treat margin as a plan asset, because plan assets include any asset in which a plan has
any "beneficial ownership interest." Prop. Reg. § 2550.401b-l(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 50363 (1979);
see text accompanying notes 55 & 56 supra. The Department may be induced to create an
exception to this rule, as it has for assets underlying certain government-guaranteed securi-
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istrative relief is provided.
2. Prohibited Transactions of Fiduciaries
If an FCM or CTA becomes a de facto fiduciary of a plan by rendering
advice which the plan follows automatically, or by otherwise assuming a
role involving the exercise of discretionary powers over some of the plan's
assets, the FCM will also be subject to the second set of prohibitions set
forth in section 406(b) of ERISA and section 4975(c)(1) of the Code.
These sections prohibit a fiduciary from dealing with plan assets for his
own interest, acting on behalf of a party with competing interests in a
transaction, or receiving compensation arising out of the transaction from
anyone other than the plan.85 Such self-dealing rules normally will not
interfere with the conduct of an FCM or CTA acting in good faith be-
cause such persons will not put themselves in a position where their inter-
ests conflict with their clients'.
However, an inadvertent violation may occur. An FCM may represent
both the buyer and seller of a particular contract in a single trade."s If
one of the parties is a plan with respect to which the FCM is a fiduciary,
the FCM may be violating the prohibition against representing a party
with interests adverse to the plan. If the FCM receives a commission from
ties notwithstanding that such underlying assets may be regarded as beneficially owned by
purchasers of the securities. See Prop. Reg. § 2550.401b-l(b), 44 Fed. Reg. 50, 363 (1979).
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. and the Futures Industry Association have re-
quested relief from the effects of the plan asset regulations. See note 64 supra.
Absent a change in the regulation, the futures industry may be forced to seek a class
exemption from the prohibited transaction rules as those rules might apply to the mainte-
nance of the margin account. No one has as yet requested such relief. The Department of
Labor currently takes more than a year to process such requests.
85 ERISA § 406(b); I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D)-(F).
88 If an FCM has two floor brokers working in the same trading pit it would be quite
likely that the FCM would be representing both sides of many contracts entered into in that
trading pit. It is also possible that the floor broker of an FCM will be executing a "cross
trade" involving an employee benefit plan and some other customer of the same FCM. If the
floor broker receives buy and sell orders to be executed at the market price from two differ-
ent customers he must first attempt to execute those trades separately by open outcry in the
trading pit. However, if he cannot find another trader willing to take an opposite position
against either of his orders he may be permitted on some exchanges to execute the contract
between his two customers. Commodity Exchange Act § 4(b)(D), 7 U.S.C. § 6b(D) (1976).
Such trades can take place only in accordance with procedures set down in rules of the
CFTC, 17 C.F.R. § 1.39 (1979), and of the exchanges. These procedures are designed to
insure that a cross trade takes place only when it is in the best interest of both customers
and when execution pursuant to open outcry has failed.
It is possible that compliance with those procedures would enable the FCM to argue
that he had not dealt with plan assets in his own interest, or in the interest of an adverse
party, within the meaning of ERISA § 406(b). Moreover, an FCM who fails to execute a
cross trade may be violating his duty to both customers to achieve the best execution possi-
ble. This tension between ERISA § 406(b) and the cross trade provisions of the Commodity
Exchange Act may be the proper subject of a request for an advisory opinion of the Depart-
ment of Labor. See ERISA Proc. 76-1, 41 Fed. Reg. 36,281 (1976).
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the party which takes the position opposite to the plan in the transaction,
the payment may violate the rule against receiving compensation from a
party with competing interests. If the FCM receives a commission from
both parties, it may raise a question of whether the FCM was managing
the plan's assets in such a way as to benefit the FCM.
The prevention of such inadvertent conflicts can be administratively
burdensome. However, the prohibited transaction rules apply regardless
of intent, and the penalties for violating the rules are quite severe.87 For
this reason, the relationship between the FCM and the plan should be
continually monitored to determine whether the FCM is exercising fiduci-
ary discretion over the plan's account. If such discretion is present, inad-
vertent self-dealing can then be avoided either by trading through an-
other FCM or, where possible, refraining from simultaneous trades
involving other clients.
3. Conclusion
The general prohibited transaction rules should not create insur-
mountable obstacles for plans using commodity futures. However, if an
FCM becomes a fiduciary to a plan, potential conflicts of interest could
create serious prohibited transaction problems. Therefore, it is advisable
to separate trading functions from investment advisory functions as much
as possible, at least until some form of administrative relief is provided.
If certain conditions are met, securities brokers are exempted from the
prohibited transaction rules by Prohibited Transaction Class Exemption
79 -1." Those rules apply to "the effecting or executing of any securities
transactions on behalf of an employee benefit plan. . . and ... the per-
formance ... of clearance, settlement, custodial or other functions inci-
dental to such transactions". Exemption 79-1 applies to "a person who is
a fiduciary with respect to ... [a] plan and who is acting in such transac-
tions as agent for the plan. . . . " FCMs could and should receive sub-
stantially identical relief since their role in effecting futures trades corre-
sponds to the role of brokers and dealers in buying and selling securities.
Unfortunately, no such exemption for FCMs has been requested, and in
view of the time the Department of Labor normally needs to respond to a
request for a class exemption, no relief can be expected in the immediate
future.
D. Unrelated Business Income Tax
1. Code Provisions
Section 511 of the Code imposes a tax on the "unrelated business tax-
able income" (UBTI) of organizations otherwise exempt from taxation
67 See note 75 supra.
Department of Labor Prohibited Transaction Class Exemption 79-1, 44 Fed. Reg.
5,963 (1979).
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under section 501(a) of the Code.89 Most employee benefit plans are
among the organizations subject to section 511. Section 512 defines unre-
lated business taxable income as "the gross income derived. . . from any
unrelated trade or business regularly carried on by [the tax-exempt or-
ganization]", less appropriate deductions.Y The tax is imposed to prevent
such organizations from using their tax exempt status to compete unfairly
with tax-paying entities in trades or businesses outside the normal ambit
of trust investment.9 1 The term "trade or business" is broadly defined92
and therefore might cover the trading of commodity futures, although the
Supreme Court has held that the term does not cover the buying and
selling of securities by individuals" or trustees generally.9 '
As a general rule, if the trade or business generating the income is
" I.R.C. § 511. The UBTI of a qualified employee plan trust would be taxed at the
rates applicable to taxable trusts under § 1(e) of the Code. These rates reach a maximum of
70% on taxable income in excess of $106,000.
90 I.R.C. § 512(a)(1).
91 The reason for UBTI was that exempt organizations, especially those founded
upon religious beliefs, were becoming more and more active in the secular business
world and were competing with taxable entities. Under the 1939 Code, exempt
organizations were not required to file information returns, so there was no way to
know the full extent of their business activities. The tax exempt entitites were
buying businesses and paying for them out of untaxed earnings: thus allowing
them to outbid taxable entitles.
Davis, The UBTI Problems for Qualified Retirement Trusts Investing in Limited Partner-
ships, 5 J. PENSION, PLAN. & COmpLuNCE 395, 396 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Davis]; see
also J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 34.14(a) (1980).
912 [I]n general, any activity of a section 511 organization which is carried on for
the production of income and which otherwise possesses the characteristics re-
quired to constitute "trade or business" within the meaning of section 162 - and
which, in addition, is not substantially related to the performance of exempt func-
tions - presents sufficient likelihood of unfair competition to be within the policy
of the tax. Accordingly, for purposes of section 513 the term "trade or business"
has the same meaning it has in section 162, and generally includes any activity
carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or performance of
services.
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (1975) (emphasis added). There is no definition of the term "trade
or business" in § 162 of the Code or the regulations thereunder. However, the IRS has
stated that a pursuit will be recognized as a trade or business for purposes of § 162 when-
ever a profit motive is present (even if no income is realized) and "some type of economic
activity" is involved. I.R.S. PuB. 334, TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESS 3 (1979). However,
management of one's own portfolio of stocks and bonds will not constitute a trade or busi-
ness. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 213, 218 (1940).
UBTI will not be realized unless the activity generating the income is "regularly carried
on by" the exempt organization. I.R.C. § 511(a). However, the question of whether the trade
or business is regularly carried on by the exempt organization is answered by comparison to
the regularity with which such activities are carried on by tax-paying entities. Infrequency
of an activity will not in itself lead to avoidance of UBTI if the business activity is charac-
teristically carried on infrequently, as with the purchase and long term leasing of equip-
ment. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. Empl. Ret. Fund v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 20, 21 (6th
Cir. 1962); Rev. Rul. 60-206, 1960-1 C.B. 201.
93 Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1940).
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Helvering, 313 U.S. 121, 126 (1941).
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substantially related to the exempt organization's purpose, the income is
not treated as UBTI.9 5 However, even if it can be said that an employee
benefit plan trust has as its purpose the holding and accumulation df
funds for later payment to participants, that does not mean that a trade
or business serves that purpose merely by generating income. Any trade
or business regularly carried on by such a trust is deemed an unrelated
trade or business."
Two important exceptions in section 512(b) modify the general defini-
tion of UBTL Subsection (b)(1) excludes "all dividends, interest, pay-
ments with respect to securities loans, and annuities, and all deductions
directly connected with such income." Subsection (b)(5) excludes all gains
or losses from the sale, exchange, or other disposition of property other
than stock in trade, or inventory or property held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of the trade or business.
2. Application to Commodity Futures
Trading in commodity futures should not create UBTI. Analogy to the
treatment of investment in securities by trustees under section 162 should
prevent gains from futures trading from being treated as income from a
trade or business. 97 Furthermore, futures trading should fall within the
section 512(b)(5) exception for gain from the sale of property.95 In Reve-
nue Ruling 66-47 the IRS held that profits from unexercised call options
on stock held by an exempt organization were UBTI.99 Apparently the
IRS overstepped the intended parameters of the term "trade or business"
because the holding of this ruling was legislatively overturned.1 00
However, the IRS has not taken a public position on the issue of
whether or under what circumstances trading in commodity futures could
constitute a trade or business for purposes of Code section 512.101 The
91 I.R.C. § 513(a); Tress. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) & (d) (1975).
Trade or business is "related" to exempt purposes, in the relevant sense, only
where the conduct of the business activities has causal relationship to the achieve-
ment of exempt purposes (other than through the production of income); and it is
"substantially related," for purposes of section 513, only if the causal relationship
is a substantial one.
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (1975); see also Tress. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4) (1975) (examples of
trade or business related to exempt purposes).
" I.R.C. § 513(b)(2); see also Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. Empl. Ret. Fund v. Commis-
sioner, 306 F.2d 20, 21 (6th Cir. 1962).
9 See note 91 supra.
" Futures trading clearly should be considered a gain from the sale of property if the
investing plan is engaging merely in an occasional hedging transaction.
Rev. Rul. 66-47, 1966-1 C.B. 112.
10* Pub. L. No. 94-396, 90 Stat. 1201 (amending I.R.C. § 512(b)(5)).
101 In order to take the position that the gain was UBTI, the IRS would have to decide
that the gains were from a trade or business, and that they were not exempt under
§ 512(b)(5). See t following 162 infra. Although the term "trade or business" is applied
broadly, the 1976 amendments to § 512(b)(5), Pub. L. No. 94-396, 90 Stat. 1201 may indi-
cate that Congress intended § 512(b)(5) to provide a very broad exemption for gains arising
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IRS might take the position that trading futures gives rise to UBTI if a
plan is making a significant profit by substantial and active trading on a
speculative basis.102 A plan contemplating such an investment strategy
might first consider seeking a private letter ruling from the IRS, particu-
larly if the strategy is to be implemented through a separate commodities
fund.10 3 Alternatively, consideration might be given to utilization of an
intermediary investment vehicle that trades futures contracts.'"
Even if it is clear that a plan would incur a tax on UBTI as a result of
trading commodity futures, this would not automatically mean that the
plan should not engage in such trading. The plan would have to deter-
mine whether the constructive purposes to be served by such trading out-
weigh the imposition of such a tax.105 If the plan is trading in futures for
the purpose of hedging an investment, the plan may not expect gains
from that trading; in fact, the plan may realize losses on its futures
trading.
E. Unrelated Debt-Financed Income
While income, if any, from trading futures should not constitute UBTI
under section 513(b) of the Code, some of such income might be taxed as
"unrelated debt-financed income" (UDFI). Section 514 of the Code de-
fines UDFI as a percentage of the income of a tax-exempt organization
arising out of the use or disposition of "debt-financed property." 08 Debt-
out of trading in organized securities markets generally.
102 The risk that a plan's investment strategy might be mistakenly characterized as
speculation is another reason for documenting a plan's purpose when trading in commodity
futures, and for setting forth the plan's objectives and methods. For example, with respect
to a participant-directed individual account plan containing a commodity futures fund, it
may be advisable to restrict the portion of the participant's account balance which can be
placed in the futures fund so that the fund can serve no more than a subordinate role in the
overall funding program.
103 It is possible that the IRS would consider UBTI to be generated by an individual
account plan which offers participants an aggressively invested segregated futures fund,
since it may be difficult to argue that the operations of the separate commodity futures fund
are merely part of an overall integrated investment scheme. This could be viewed as a sepa-
rately conducted scheme to speculate in commodity futures on a tax-deferred basis.
104 Currently, investment in a common trust fund should avoid application of the unre-
lated business tax, regardless of the nature of the trust's underlying income, because the
income received by the plan should be considered to be passive income exempted from the
UBTI by Code § 512(b)(1). Rev. Rul. 67-301, 1967-2 C.B. 146. See also PLR 7840039, [1978]
PRIVATE LETTER RULINGS (P-H) 2863; PLR 7848051, [1978] PRIVATE LETrER RULINGS (P-
H) 2751. However, consideration must be given to Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.584-
2(c)(3), 45 Fed. Reg. 62,848 (1980), which apparently would have the effect of overturning
these rulings.
105 For an example of the balancing of relative benefit versus relative detriment in the
UBTI area, see Davis, supra note 91, at 398-400.
106 I.R.C. § 514(a). The primary reason for the creation of a tax on UDFI was a belief
that some exempt organizations were being used as part of an overall device which abused
the tax exempt status of the organizations:
During the past several years a device has been developing which exploits
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financed property is "any property which is held to produce income and
with respect to which there is an acquisition indebtedness . .. at any
time during the taxable year."107 Acquisition indebtedness means any in-
debtedness incurred in acquiring or jnproving property, including indebt-
edness incurred before, during or after the acquisition or improvement.
The percentage of income from debt-financed property which is treated
as UDFI corresponds to the percentage that the acquisition indebtedness
bears to the adjusted basis of that property. Thus, if an employee benefit
plan incurs debt in connection with the acquisition of property, a propor-
tional amount of the income or gain therefrom will be taxed as UDFI.
Gains realized from the buying and selling of securities on margin are
treated as UDFI. The IRS first indicated that income from the debt-
financed acquisition of securities was UDFI in 1971,108 and in Elliot Knit-
wear Profit Sharing Plan v. Commissioner that position recently was up-
held.108 In Elliot Knitwear, a profit-sharing plan purchased securities "on
margin," paying only a portion of the purchase price. 10 The plan argued
that incurring such debt was inherent to its tax-exempt function, which
would have allowed the plan to avoid UDFI treatment under Code section
514(c)(4). The plan also contended that the acquired property was "sub-
stantially related" to the performance of its exempt function, which
would have allowed the plan to avoid UDFI treatment under Code section
514(b)(1)(A). The Third Circuit affirmed a finding against the plan on
both issues.
With respect to the first contention, the plan argued that its exempt
purpose was to accumulate income for its employees, and that therefore
its exempt purpose included the investment of funds.1 The Third Cir-
cuit held that the fact that the plan was authorized to purchase securities
on margin and was granted exempt status by the IRS does not lead to the
conclusion that such purchases were inherent to its exempt purpose. The
court felt such a conclusion would undermine the statute. 112 The court
weaknesses in the rules governing exempt organizations. The net effect is the use
of the tax exemption to reduce taxes for owners of a business by converting ordi-
nary income to capital gain and eventually to the acquisition of the business by a
tax exempt organization entirely out of the earnings of that business. This device
was challenged by the Government in the courts but existing law was construed by
the Supreme Court to support it...
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 464 (1970). The case reference is to the Supreme
Court's decision in Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
1-1 LR.C. § 514(b).
108 Rev. Rul. 71-311, 1971-2 C.B. 184. There is a more explicit statement of the IRS
position on UDFI and debt-financed acquisition of securities in Rev. Rul. 74-197, 1974-1
C.B. 143.
1- 614 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1980), af'g, 71 T.C. 765 (1979).
110 The rest of the purchase price was, in effect, borrowed from the broker. This is what
is typically referred to as margin buying in the securities context. Margin buying in a fu-
tures context is different. See note 118 supra.
614 F.2d at 349-50.
11 Id. at 350.
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believed the exempt purpose of a profit-sharing plan is to provide for em-
ployee participation in employer profits.113 While the court characterized
investment of the employer's contributions "for the additional accumula-
tion of income and gains" as a desirable function, the court pointed out
that the plan could accomplish this without borrowing. Thus, it was not
essential to the existence of such a plan." 4
In presenting its second contention, the plan argued that the purpose
of a qualified profit-sharing plan includes the accumulation of income and
gains through investment in securities." 5 The Third Circuit held that al-
though it is reasonable to expect that the buying and selling of income-
producing property will be a method utilized to increase and accumulate
income and gain, this is solely a means of accomplishing the purpose of
deferred compensation, not the purpose of the plan itself." 6 The court
said that even if one assumes, for argument, that investment of contribu-
tions for accumulation of income is a function of a profit-sharing plan,
the acquisition of securities on margin is not necessary for such accumu-
113 The Elliott Knitwear court apparently adopted the narrow view that the tax-ex-
empt purpose of a profit sharing plan is limited to the provision of deferred compensation
through a participation in employer profits contributed to the plan. With regard to pension
plans, the IRS believes the tax-exempt purpose or function to be the receipt of contribu-
tions and the use of contributions and increments thereon to provide pension benefits to the
employee participants at retirement. Rev. Rul. 74-197, 1974-1 C.B. 143.
114 614 F.2d at 350. The Third Circuit ruled inter alia, that defining "inherent" as sy-
nonymous with "essential" was not clear error as the plan contended. The court further said
that while investment of the fund was probably inherent to its tax-exempt function, debt-
financed investment was not. "[The plan] will still function as intended. Certainly a fiduci-
ary would not be surcharged for refraining from engaging in debt-financed market specula-
tion." Id. Because the narrow issue before the Third Circuit was whether debt-financed in-
come was inherent or essential to the tax-exempt function, the court's statement that
investing for "additional accumulation of income and gains" is not essential and may be
dictum.
The Third Circuit's definition of a plan's tax-exempt purpose differs from the view held
by Daniel I. Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Legislation:
Generally speaking, exempt organizations are able to earn portfolio income tax
free as a by-product of an exemption granted for some other reason. It is not a
necessary feature of the exemptions accorded most organizations listed in section
501(c) that the benefit of the exemption extend to portfolio income. On the other
hand, exemption is accorded to trusts forming part of qualified retirement plans
because the resulting subsidy in the form of tax deferral is the very raison d'etre
for the exemption of these trusts. We are less troubled by allowing them to maxi-
mize the benefits of their exemption through certain kinds of leverage
investments.
Proposed Amendments to LR.C. § 513(b): Hearings on H.R. 2162 Before the Subcommittee
on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess
2 (1980) (testimony of Daniel I. Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Tax Legislation). H.R. 2162 would exclude certain leveraged real estate investment income
from UDFI.
115 614 F.2d at 349.
'1 Id. at 350. The Third Circuit stressed that I.R.C. § 514(b)(1)(A) explicitly states
that the statute does not exclude property that is substantially related by virtue of the
"need of the organization for income or funds." 611 F.2d at 350.
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lation or for the purpose of providing deferred compensation." 7
The concept of margin in the context of the purchasing of securities is
different from the concept of margin in the context of commodity futures
trading. The commodity futures margin is not a down payment, but is
more in the nature of "earnest money" - money put up by the trader to
assure his commitment to meet his obligations., s Since the contract is an
agreement for future performance (i.e., the buyer has no right to delivery
until he pays and has no obligation to pay until delivery date), there is no
indebtedness. This is distinguishable from buying equity securities on
margin. In that case, full consideration is given immediately, in part with
funds borrowed from the broker or others, and the securities are delivered
at the same time.
However, the IRS inclination to interpret the definition of UBTI ex-
pansively11 9 has carried over into issues relating to UDFI as well. In a
recent Private Letter Ruling,1 0 the IRS held, in connection with an em-
ployee plan utilizing individual insurance policies, that certain property
117 611 F.2d at 350. The Third Circuit and IRS views as to the tax-exempt purpose or
function of a profit-sharing or pension plan should be compared to the opinion of the Su-
preme Court in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979). In Daniel,
the Supreme Court held that the federal securities laws do not apply to compulsory, non-
contributory defined benefit pension plans because the employee's interest does not consti-
tute a security, or "investment contract" within the meaning of SEC v. J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293 (1946). The Supreme Court failed to find "an investment in a common venture
premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others". 439 U.S. at 561. The Daniel court noted that
[T]he court below found an expectation of profit in the pension plan only by fo-
cusing on one of its less important aspects to the exclusion of its more significant
elements. It is true that the Fund, like other holders of large assets, depends to
some extent on earnings from its assets. In the case of a pension fund, however, a
far larger portion of its income comes from employer contributions, a source in no
way dependent on the efforts of the Fund's managers .... Not only does the
greater share of a pension plan's income ordinarily come from new contributions,
but unlike most entrepreneurs who manage other people's money, a plan usually
can count on increased employer contributions, over which the plan itself has no
control, to cover shortfalls in earnings.
Id. at 561-62.
n8 A futures contract in practice does not involve a credit transaction . . ... Nor-
mally futures contracts are liquidated before delivery of the commodity. In addi-
tion, the 'margin' paid under the rules of various commodity exchanges is not re-
ally 'margin' as the term is used under the Exchange Act. The down payment on a
futures contract (margin) merely represents good-faith money on the part of the
purchaser of the contract. Such good-faith money must be increased if the value
of the commodity decreases. If [securities] margin [buying] rules were applicable
to the futures market, the mechanics of the market might be frustrated, particu-
larly if the rules paralleled the percentage requirements of the general account
under... [securities rules]. The very purpose of the futures market is to hedge a
position by making use of a speculative device. To the extent leverage is de-
stroyed, both speculation and hedging becomes impracticable.
WOLFSON, PmLLIPS & Russo, supra note 71, 1 9.03[6][d].
11 See text accompanying notes 97-103 supra.
120 PLR 7918095, [1979] PrVATE Lwrrm RuLINGS (P-H) 1 3366.
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purchased with funds derived from insurance policy loans was debt-
financed property that would result in UDFI. In its ruling, the IRS ac-
knowledged the "seemingly well established principle" that life-insurance
policy loans do not constitute indebtedness but chose to follow a lesser
line of contrary authority.121 The IRS stated that:
In enacting Code Section 514, Congress attempted to prevent a
tax-exempt organization from using borrowed funds to ultimately
receive additional property at no expense to itself, rather than
merely trying to find a means of investing its own funds at an
adequate rate of return.
122
Because trading commodity futures does not involve the use of "bor-
rowed funds," it is extremely difficult to justify the application of Code
section 514 to gains from such trading.1 23 However, Private Letter Ruling
7918095 creates the concern that the IRS might treat some varieties of
leveraging as involving indebtedness for purposes of Code section 514
even if there is significant authority in law and logic for the proposition
that such leveraging does not involve debt. Moreover, it can be argued
that allowing an employee plan to engage in leveraging, that is, to enjoy
the market gains and be liable for market losses on the basis of the full
market price, without having to expend, initially, the full market price, is
not good public policy.124 From one point of view, trading commodity fu-
tures involves just such leveraging.12 5 It is possible that future legislative
or interpretive developments may extend the concept of Code section 514
to investment techniques such as trading futures which do involve lever-
121 Id. After having noted the "seemingly well established principle" that life-insurance
policy loans do not constitute indebtedness, the Service found that there was "a line of
authority" to the opposite effect with regard to interest deductions under § 163 of the Code.
This other authority, which is confined to a narrow and unrelated issue, does not appear to
be a compelling reason for rejecting the general rule.
.22 PLR, 7918095 [1979] PRiVATz LEarR RULINGS (P-H) 3366.
1is Obviously, if debt can be found, the logic of Elliot Knitwear, 614 F.2d 347 (3d Cir.
1980) would lead to the characterization of any gains as UDFI. But see t following note 162
infra.
"' Assistant Treasury Secretary Daniel Halperin, in discussing proposed tax legislation
that would permit plans to make leveraged real estate investments, stated:
[I]t seems to us that legislation of this sort cannot properly be considered without
an assessment of the general wisdom of encouraging pension assets to be invested
on a leveraged basis in real estate equities. The use of leverage in a real estate
investment, while enhancing an investor's ability to benefit from rises in prices for
real estate generally, may also entail greater vulnerability to economic fluctua-
tions, a matter of serious concern where the security of assets held to meet pen-
sion liabilities is involved.
Hearings on S. 650 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980) (testimony of Daniel I.
Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Legislation).
'2' See Hearings on Price Volatility in the Silver Futures Market Before the Sub-
comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 127-128 (1980) (testi-
mony of Hon. Harold M. Williams, Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission).
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aging but which do not involve debt.
F. Banking InstitutionM
Banking institutions acting as trustees are subject to the fiduciary re-
sponsibility provisions of ERISA like any other trustee, so the prudence
and trust requirements as well as many of the prohibited transactions
problems discussed above will apply to these institutions.12" However, be-
cause ERISA does not preempt other federal laws, or state banking or
insurance laws, 127 if a banking institution is a trustee of plan assets which
might be invested in commodity futures both federal and state banking
laws will have to be considered.1 28
1. Nationally Chartered Banks
The Comptroller of the Currency has the power to authorize and regu-
late trust activities of national banks. 29 Under regulations of the Comp-
troller,130 a national bank acting as a trustee can invest trust funds in any
investment allowed by the trust instrument. If the trust instrument does
not specify the bank's investment powers, the bank may invest in
whatever investments corporate fiduciaries may invest in under local law.
The Comptroller has stated recently that it will look to ERISA rather
than local law to determine the appropriateness of "speculative" invest-
ments on behalf of trusts containing employee benefit plan funds. Trust
M See text accompanying notes 27-53 supra (prudence requirements); text accompany-
ing notes 54-73 supra (trust requirements); text accompanying notes 74-88 supra (prohib-
ited transactions).
1" ERISA § 514(a) states that ERISA supersedes all state laws insofar as they relate to
any employee benefit plan. However, § 514(b)(2)(A) states that. . . "nothing in this title
shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regu-
lates insurance, banking, or securities". Which state laws will be considered to regulate
banking, and which state laws will be considered merely to affect banking, has not yet been
fully decided. However, it is likely that any state law regulating the power of banks to act as
trustees will be considered a banking regulation and therefore will not be preempted. See
generally Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 80 (1978).
12s The bank may be a directed trustee of plan assets, in which case it has no invest-
ment discretion, or it may have limited or total discretion with respect to the investments it
makes. If it is given sufficient discretion by the plan, it may commingle a plan's funds with
those of other plans.
129 The Comptroller has the power to authorize banks to act in a fiduciary capacity, and
to place restrictions on such activity. 12 U.S.C. § 92a. The Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System has authority to regulate the activities of national banks, 12 U.S.C. §
248, as does the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b). However,
neither agency intrudes on the Comptroller's regulatory activity in this area as a matter of
practice, and national banks thus do not need to consider Federal Reserve or FDIC regula-
tions at this time. Generally speaking, states do not have the power to regulate the trust
activities of national banks. See Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition
in Regulation, 30 STA. L. Rxv. 1, 6 (1977); Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA.
L. REv. 565, 771 (1966).
130 12 C.F.R. §§ 9.11-9.22 (1979).
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Banking Circular 15, restated on July 13, 1979 and modifying the Comp-
troller's earlier positions on speculative investments, states that:
Employee benefit accounts which are subject to ERISA are now
governed by the rule of prudence established pursuant to that
statute. Under the prudence rule the relative riskiness of a spe-
cific investment or investment course of action does not render
such investment or investment course of action either per se pru-
dent or imprudent. The prudence of each investment decision
should be judged with regard to the role that the proposed invest-
ment or investment course of action plays within the overall port-
folio. The fiduciary must act in a manner consistent with appro-
priate consideration of the facts and circumstances that the
fiduciary knows or should know are relevant, and document that
it has done so. 1"1
Although Trust Banking Circular 15 does not deal directly with futures
trading, the Comptroller has traditionally treated futures trading as a
speculative investment. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the Comp-
troller will defer to ERISA with regard to such trading.1
3 2
13, Comptroller of the Currency, Trust Banking Circular No. 15 (July 13, 1979).
131 The Comptroller originally took the position that banks acting as trustees were not
allowed to engage in "speculative investments", which included commodity futures invest-
ments. See Comptroller's Handbook for National Trust Examiners, Opinion 9.4070. In this
opinion, the Comptroller took the position that all "speculative" investments were forbid-
den. This included all investments in commodities and commodity futures. Since that time
the Comptroller has taken an increasingly liberal approach with regard to individual and
commingled trust accounts. In Opinion 9.4205 the Comptroller stated:
If state law expressly and explicitly authorizes fiduciaries to sell covered options, a
national bank located in that state may do so. This would be true even if the
governing instrument in question did not contain express authority. In such a case
a broad discretionary investment power would be satisfactory.
Id.
In September of 1978, the Comptroller issued a letter to an individual bank allowing
that bank to purchase Treasury Bill futures on behalf of a common trust fund as a hedging
technique. Deputy Comptroller for Specialized Examinations, Opinion No. 62, [1978-1979
Transfer Binder] FEn. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 185,137. The common trust fund involved in
Opinion No. 62 apparently did not contain any employee plan assets, though there is noth-
ing which would indicate that a different result would have been reached if it had contained
such assets. That opinion distinguished between futures contracts in financial instruments
and futures contracts in more traditional commodities. The Comptroller held that while
investments in the latter were still considered improper, investments in certain financial
instrument futures could be justified if they served to hedge certain cash market invest-
ments in instruments which had traditionally been considered legitimate investments. Id. at
77,136.
Opinion No. 62 drew in part upon the Comptroller's evolving approach to investment in
futures by banks acting for their own account, as set forth in Banking Circular 79. Comp-
troller of the Currency, Banking Circular 79 (Nov. 2, 1976) [current] FED. BANKING L. REP.
(CCH) 96,977 [hereinafter cited as Banking Circular 79]. In Banking Circular 79, the
Comptroller took the position that banks could invest for their own account to a very lim-
ited extent in financial instrument futures, but that they had to conform to a restrictive set
of guidelines, and had to obtain prior approval for such investments from the Comptroller.
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While adopting ERISA as the operative law,'the Comptroller retains
jurisdiction to decide whether a national bank is investing employee ben-
efit plan funds properly. Bank examiners will approve or disapprove of
those activities based on the examiner's judgment of whether the activity
meets ERISA standards.13 3
One guide for banks wishing to set up a futures trading program ac-
ceptable to bank examiners is Trust Banking Circular 2 which provides a
procedure for trading options.'" The procedure insures that there is 1)
specific authority to trade in options, 2) approval of specific investment
schemes, 3) proper record keeping and accounting, and 4) a system of
adequate internal safeguards for the operation of the options trading pro-
gram. Although Trust Banking Circular 2 applies to options rather than
futures, it provides a sound, workable example of how a bank trustee, or
any trustee, should conduct any kind of money market trading on behalf
of an employee benefit plan.
The Comptroller is authorized to give bankers prior approval for pro-
grams of futures investing, and it may be advisable to seek such approval.
Recently the Comptroller gave specific approval to Harris Trust & Sav-
ings to trade in futures for hedging purposes on behalf of employee plan
trusts.13 5 While the Harris Bank, as a state-chartered bank, did not need
to seek Comptroller approval, it stated that it had done so "as a matter of
policy." This is the first instance of explicit Comptroller approval of fu-
tures trading on behalf of trusts. The Comptroller may soon issue a re-
vised banking circular dealing with bank trust investment in futures
generally.
3 6
2. Federally Chartered Savings Banks and Savings & Loan
Institutions
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
A revised version of Banking Circular 79, however, allows freer investment in financial fu-
tures and removes the necessity for obtaining prior approval for banks investing for their
own account. Comptroller of the Currency, Banking Circular 79, 44 Fed. Reg. 66,722, revised
March 19, 1980 [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKuG L. REP. (CCH) 98,190.
3S3 See Comptroller of the Currency, Trust Banking Circular 14 (June 26, 1979).
3 Comptroller of the Currency, Trust Banking Circular 2, (Dec. 19, 1979), 5 FED.
BANKING L. REP. 1 59,292.
I" Comptroller Gives Harris Bank Trust Free Rein to Trade T-Bond Futures, SEcUtI-
TIS WEEK, Feb. 11, 1980, at 9.
136 While Banking Circular 79, supra note 131, does not apply to banks investing as
trustees, the news release that accompanied the November 1979 revision stated that the
Comptroller "may issue a similar policy statement for bank trust departments... at a later
time." Comptroller of the Currency, Press Release No. 15 (Nov. 2, 1976) Thus, bank trustees
might anticipate that the Comptroller will soon take a position similar to Banking Circular
79 with regard to trust investment in futures. It should also be noted that revised Banking
Circular 79 was part of a joint release by the Comptroller, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Thus, state chartered Member banks
and federally insured Non-member banks may receive the same guidance with regard to
trust investment in futures that national banks may receive.
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of 1980 gives the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) the author-
ity to grant trustee powers to certain federally chartered savings banks
and savings & loan institutions.137 The FHLBB has not yet granted any
such power, and analysis of questions relating to the exercise of such
powers must obviously await FHLBB action.
3. State Chartered Institutions
ERISA does not preempt state banking laws."s8 State-chartered banks,
thrift institutions (including savings banks) and trust companies acting as
trustees will have to take into consideration local law requirements re-
garding proper investments by trustees. 3 9 Even if state law allows trading
in commodity futures by such institutions when they are acting as trust-
ees, 40 Federal Reserve Board, FSLIC and FDIC rules and regulations
may have to be reviewed in order to insure that the institutions are acting
properly in trading futures.
4
If a state-chartered bank is commingling the assets of trusts in a com-
mon trust fund, the bank must comply with rules and regulations of the
Comptroller in order for the common trust fund to qualify for tax-exempt
status under section 584 of the Code. 142 The Federal Home Loan Bank
Board and the Federal Reserve Board may join the Comptroller in ruling
137 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, P.L. 96-
221, 94 Stat. 142 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3524 (Supp. I 1980)). This Act gives the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board the power to grant special permission to savings banks and
savings and loan institutions
to act as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, or in any other fiduciary ca-
pacity in which State banks, trust companies, or other corporations which come
into competition with [savings banks and savings and loan institutions] are per-
mitted to act under the laws of the State in which the association is located.
Id. § 403; 12 U.S.C. § 1464(n)(1) (Supp. I 1980).
"I See note 126 supra.
13 As with the Comptroller's regulations regarding national banks, state laws generally
allow bank trustees to invest trust assets in accordance with specific instructions in the trust
instrument. See TRUST RESTATEAENT, supra note 42, § 186. In the absence of specific in-
structions in the trust instrument, state laws either require adherence to a legal list of in-
vestments, see, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 19, § 3-120, or a prudent man standard, see, e.g., N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 100-6; N.Y. EST., PowERs & TRusTs LAW § 11-2(a)(1), or a combination of
the two, see, e.g, N.J. Rav. STAT. §§ 3A.15-1 to 15.-5, 15-35 to 15-41.
140 State law may not allow an institution to act as a trustee in the first place. All states
allow state-chartered commercial banks and trust companies to act as trustees, but author-
ity for savings banks and thrift institutions varies from state to state.
141 The Federal Reserve Board has the authority to regulate the conduct of trust invest-
ment by state-chartered Member banks. 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1976). For authority of the Federal
Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation to regulate the conduct of state chartered insured
Savings & Loan Institutions, see 12 U.S.C. § 1470 (1976). For authority of the FDIC, see 12
U.S.C. § 1818.
142 I.R.C. § 584(a)(2). If the bank is commingling only the assets of employee plan
trusts, and is willing to operate the commingled trust in accordance with the requirements
of I.R.C. § 401 relating to qualified employee plans, the commingled trust can enjoy tax-
exempt status as a group trust. Rev. Rul. 56-267, 1956-1 C.B. 206. If this is done, the bank
can avoid compliance with certain rules and regulations of the Comptroller.
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on investment of trust assets in futures.143
E. Pooled Investment Vehicles
Many plans, especially smaller plans, will want to trade commodity
futures indirectly through the purchase of interests in pooled investment
vehicles (PIVs) which will in turn trade wholly or in part in commodity
futures.144 A plan which indirectly trades in futures does not need to de-
velop the degree of expertise in these markets needed by direct investors.
The kinds of PIVs presently trading in futures take several forms, al-
though they are primarily limited partnerships. While there are a great
number of commodity futures pools in existence, the structuring of pools
specifically to accommodate investment by employee benefit plans is only
beginning. A plan's choice of a particular PIV or variety of PIVs will de-
pend on several factors, including the ERISA problems raised or solved
by that vehicle.
1. Prudence Requirement
Indirect trading may involve different considerations when determin-
ing whether the plan meets the prudence requirement. The plan can limit
its commitment through indirect trading. Additionally, the plan may be
able to rely on the expertise of the pool manager and thus may avoid
liability for individual trading decisions.' 45 Hedging is the most easily jus-
tifiable use of futures, however, and when a plan trades indirectly it not
only has less control over the positions taken by the pool but probably
cannot correlate specific positions in the futures market to specific plan
assets. The plan cannot identify specific hedges. Therefore, plans which
trade futures indirectly may have to justify their investment in a pool as
143 See note 135 supra.
"" The Commodity Exchange Act provides a measure of protection for investors in
commodity future PIVs through the regulation of "commodity pool operators." Section
2(a)(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act provides as follows:
For the purposes of this Act, the term "commodity pool operator" shall mean
any person engaged in a business which is of the nature of an investment trust,
syndicate, or similar form of enterprise, and who, in connection therewith, solicits,
accepts, or receives from others, funds, securities or property, either directly or
through capital contributions, the sale of stock or other forms of securities, or
otherwise, for the purpose of trading in any commodity for future delivery on or
subject to the rules of any contract market, but does not include such persons not
within the intent of this definition as the Commission may specify by rule or regu-
lation or by order.
Id.; 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. II 1979).
Commodity pool operators are required to be registered with the CFTC, to maintain
specified books and records, to provide detailed disclosures to prospective pool participants,
and to provide periodic reports to pool participants. See Commodity Exchange Act §§ 4.21-
4.24; 7 U.S.C. § 6n (1976). In addition, § 4(o) of the Commodity Exchange Act specifically
prohibits fraudulent and deceptive practices by commodity pool operators. 7 U.S.C. § 6(o)
(1976).
14" See note 39 supra.
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prudent speculation in futures. Although any investment which is new or
which involves an amount of risk might in isolation be considered impru-
dent, indirect trading in futures might be justifiable on the basis of its
role in relation to the rest of the portfolio in general. However, a plan
might not be able to justify as large a commitment of assets as it could if
it were trading directly and could identify specific hedges. If a plan can-
not identify specific hedges, poor performance by the pool manager will
be less tolerable since it cannot be linked to identifiable gains in another
portion of the plan's portfolio. Thus, a plan should pay considerable at-
tention to the investment quality of the PIV.
A plan can judge the investment qualify of a PIV in part by past per-
formance. However, a plan must also review the experience and integrity
of those who will be managing the PIV. The plan must also study all
available disclosure documents especially with regard to the trading pro-
gram to be followed by those managing the PIV's assets, and it must be
able later to determine whether that program is being followed. A plan
must continue to review periodically the PIV's performance, personnel,
and investment program.
2. Trust Considerations
When a plan invests in any PIV, the assets of the PIV may or may not
be treated as plan assets. If the plan's interest in a PIV does not result in
the underlying assets' being treated as plan assets, ERISA section 403
merely requires that the trustee of the plan retain custody and control of
that which represents ownership of or participation in the PIV. If the
underlying assets are treated as plan assets, the plan must make a deter-
mination as to whether those assets are properly held in trust and
whether the person with authority and discretion to manage those assets
was appointed in compliance with ERISA section 403.
The purchase of an interest in a PIV that under local law conveys a
beneficial ownership in the underlying assets, such as an interest in a
trust or a partnership, will probably cause the property held by the PIV
to be treated as plan assets under ERISA. 14 6 If an employee plan is to
avoid the problems associated with this treatment of the underlying as-
sets, the plan must either purchase an interest in a 1940 Act investment
company or a security evidencing an interest in a PIV. This security must
be freely transferable, widely held, and properly registered.1 4 7 Unfortu-
148 See text accompanying note 55 supra.
1 There are four exceptions to the general rule of the proposed plan asset regulation
that a plan asset is any asset in which the plan has a beneficial ownership interest. Only two
of the exceptions might apply in the case of a PIV trading in futures. The first exception is
provided for investments in registered investment companies. If a plan is investing in a
registered investment company which invests part of its assets in commodity futures the
plan can consider its investment as an effective shield whereby only the interest in the in-
vestment company itself is treatable as a plan asset.
Under § 2550.401b-l(e), if an employee plan purchases an equity security issued by a
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nately, most commodity pools do not meet either criterion.
If the underlying assets are treated as plan assets, the PIV must be a
trust, or the assets of the PIV must be held in trust.148 In either event,
the person who manages the underlying assets must be either named in
the plan document or in the plan trust instrument or must be appointed
by a person who is a named fiduciary of the plan.14 9 For reasons discussed
above, an FCM or CTA may have difficulty in assuming formal discretion
over commodity futures trading by a PIV in which employee plans
invest.150
The requirement that all plan assets be held in trust, including pre-
sumably property which is held by a PIV but which fails to meet the
subsection (e) criteria for exception from the definition of plan assets in
the proposed plan asset regulations, presents special problems. Attention
should be focused on the distinction between "holding" and "custody." A
trustee "holds" real property in trust, for example, if it owns the real
property, but it need only have custody of that which evidences such
ownership interest (i.e., the indicia of ownership). Neither ERISA section
403, the proposed plan asset regulations, 152 nor the proposed regulations
under section 403152 specifically address whether custody by the plan's
pool, the question of whether the underlying assets are plan assets will be answered without
regard to whether the plan has a beneficial ownership interest in the underlying assets. In-
stead, the underlying assets will always be treated as plan assets unless the pool and the
security issued by the pool satisfy a strict set of conditions. In the case of a PIV that is
created for purposes other than investment in real estate, the security itself must be:
(i) Freely transferable;
(ii) Widely held; and
(iii) Either (A) registered under section 12(b) or 12(g) of the Securities Ex-
change Act as part of an offering of such securities to the public pursuant to an
effective registration statement. * .
Id. There are a few PIVs currently in existence, the shares of which may fit within the above
language. It is extremely doubtful, however, that a PIV investing in commodity futures
could be designed or operated so as to fit within the exception to the rule of subsection (e)
for "operating companies". If a commodity futures pool could be designed to fit within the
exception for operating companies, it might well have serious UBTI consequences for plans
investing in the pool See text accompanying notes 89-105 supra.
10 Even if the PIV is or can be a trust, it may be that such trust must be a qualified
group trust or common trust fund in order to avoid disqualification of the investing plan for
tax purposes. Rev. Rul. 56-267, 1956-1 C.B. 206. If the IRS were to adopt the Department of
Labor's interpretation of plan assets, then it is possible that where the underlying assets of
the pool are plan assets those assets must be placed in a trust which complies with the
requirements of § 401 of the Code, as in the case of a group trust, or § 584 of the Code
relating to bank common trust funds. Hopefully the IRS would not adopt a rule similar to
that promulgated by the Department; employee plans would only be able to trade commod-
ity futures directly or through mutual funds, insurance companies, banks or entities whose
securities comply with the widely held securities exception under Proposed Regulation §
2250.401b-1(e), 44 Fed. Reg. 50 (1979).
148 ERISA § 403. See text accompanying notes 65-73 supra.
"5 See text accompanying notes 85-87 supra.
,81 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
1' See notes 55 & 56 supra.
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trustee of the indicia of an ownership interest in a PIV is sufficient to
satisfy section 403 in those cases where a) the property managed by the
PIV manager is determined to be plan assets, and b) the PIV manager
has therefore been formally recognized by the plan as a fiduciary with
investment discretion. The Department of Labor has said that the focus
of the PIV rules in the proposed plan asset regulation is to determine
whether, in substance, the manager of the PIV has been delegated invest-
ment discretion. 153 This is certainly a valid regulatory purpose, but it
need not lead to the literal conclusion that custody of all property man-
aged by a PIV manager for a plan has to be in the custody of the plan's
trustee.
3. Prohibited Transactions
If the underlying assets of a PIV, such as a commodity pool, are
treated as plan assets, a host of potential prohibited transactions will
arise whether or not the trust requirement has been satisfied. The opera-
tor of the PIV will be managing the underlying assets. If those assets are
plan assets, the services provided by the PIV operator will result in treat-
ment of the PIV operator as a disqualified person, and probably as a
fiduciary.
Once the PIV operator, or the PIV itself, has become a disqualified
person, further transactions between the PIV or the PIV operator and the
plan are prohibited. These further transactions include any future sales
between the PIV and the plan, the provision of unrelated services in the
future between the PIV and the plan, or any transactions which may be
collateral to but are separate from the actual sale of the interest in the
PIV to the plan.""
IV. Overview
The fact that investment managers of employee benefit plan funds are
only now beginning to explore the utilization of commodity futures is un-
derstandable. These managers traditionally have had very conservative
opinions as to prudent investment conduct. It was not until after World
War II that such fiduciaries committed significant percentages of their
portfolios to equity investments. The passage of ERISA in 1974 intro-
duced new uncertainties because it established new specific federal re-
quirements of prudence and diversification as well as a new framework
for allocation and delegation of fiduciary responsibility. Before ERISA
the pension community also lacked the authority for a more expansive
interpretation of prudence. Paradoxically, this authority is now provided
by the Department of Labor's prudence regulation.
However, the timing of the recent interest by plans in futures trading
153 45 Fed. Reg. 38,085 (1980).
I See note 75 supra.
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has much to do with the markets themselves. The relevance of futures
trading to employee plan funds was not readily apparent until the devel-
opment of financial instrument or interest-rate futures in the mid-to-late
1970s. The commodity futures exchanges and the regulation of the ex-
changes (as well as those who trade on them) are still in a developing
stage. Moreover, psychological factors cannot be totally discounted: the
open outcry method of trading, the dramatic amount of leverage em-
ployed in trading, the use of the terms "speculation" or "speculator," and
the large percentage of traders who are speculators, are all factors con-
tributing to a wariness which institutional investors often must overcome
before deciding to enter the commodity futures markets. Successful com-
modity futures trading requires considerable sophistication.
Against this background, it should not be surprising that when em-
ployee plan fund managers decide to trade commodity futures, they dis-
cover that there are unresolved legal questions and some outright legal
obstacles. The relevant provisions of ERISA and the Code were not
drafted with any thought in mind that plans might wish to trade com-
modity futures. The legal characterization of futures as other than securi-
ties has developed without any thought given to the effects of such char-
acterization on employee plan investments. The IRS and the Department
of Labor, in their regulation of employee plans, have not had sufficient
occasion to consider commodity futures trading by plans. The result is
that the rules which have been developed to regulate employee plans have
accidentally created in some cases legal questions and impediments to the
trading of futures by plans. In other cases, because of the novelty of fu-
tures trading by plans, appropriate interpretations and exceptions have
not yet been developed with regard to those rules which concededly
should apply to plans trading futures.
The accidentally created legal problems can be resolved through effort
and education. If an interested person were to take the initiative, Prohib-
ited Transaction Exemption 79-1 might well be extended by the Depart-
ment of Labor to cover FCMs, as well as securities brokers. Because mar-
gin trading in commodity futures so clearly does not involve the use of
debt, the IRS should rule, if requested to do so, that a plan does not
realize UDFI from trading futures under the present provisions of Code
section 514.155 Resolution of the more difficult problems, such as CTAs
acting as investment managers and margin being held in trust, will re-
quire not only education but also deliberation by regulators, and perhaps
by Congress.
Whether and under what conditions employee plans can gain access to
the futures markets is a question which must turn on whether employee
plans should have access to the futures markets. Whether plans should
have access to the futures markets must be decided on the basis of public
policy. Tax benefits have been granted by statute to many varieties of
15 See t following note 162 infra.
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employee plans because it is perceived that they serve an important social
end. For the same reason, an elaborate regulatory scheme governing the
structure and operation of employee plans has been constructed.
The opinions of the IRS,156 the Third Circuit, 7 the Supreme Court,158
and a Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, 59 discussed above,
illustrate why employee plans might merit tax benefits and regulatory
oversight. While the opinions differ regarding what might be the essential
qualities of pension and profit-sharing plans, it is clear that all of these
authorities recognize that plans do not exist merely to defer employee
compensation. They exist primarily to provide a sharing of profits, a pen-
sion, an equity interest in the business concern, or perhaps some form of
health, accident or other welfare benefit. Realizing income from the in-
vestment of funds set aside to achieve these ends is important and very
helpful, and may even be an essential part of funded employee plans.
However, it is the eventual benefits which the employees are to receive
that are the justification for the special treatment of such plans. The in-
vestment of funds is but one means of insuring that the promised benefits
will in fact be realized.
Thus unfettered access to the futures market cannot be justified
merely because such access affords the opportunity for profit. Access and
the ease of access must be determined on the basis of how commodity
futures can help funded employee benefit plans provide their respective
benefits. There is little doubt that commodity futures trading, in at least
some circumstances, is perfectly consistent with the goal of insuring the
provision of plan benefits.
At least some hedge transactions, such as those described in the two
examples in Section H1 of this article, 6 0 are logically consistent with even
the most conservative views as to the role of investment management in
providing employee benefits through a funded plan. In the case of a de-
fined benefit pension plan, for example, an actuary determines the ade-
quacy of the fund to meet promised benefits and then informs the em-
ployer approximately how much money must be contributed to the fund
to insure that it remains adequate. The amount of the contribution is
premised on certain assumptions, including the future investment per-
formance of the trustee or investment manager. By hedging with com-
modity futures, the plan trustee or investment manager can more easily
attain the funding targets that have been set by the actuary and the em-
ployer as the trustee invests and reinvests the employer contributions.
The net costs to the fund for use of this very helpful tool are the broker-
age commissions and the loss of opportunity to profit from unanticipated
changes in the market.
1 See note 113 supra.
See text accompanying notes 109-117 supra.
15 See text accompanying notes 93 & 94 supra.
1" See text accompanying note 123 supra.
160 See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
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Because in some circumstances trading commodity futures clearly can
help employee benefit plans provide the benefits they have promised,
those who regulate such plans ought not to preclude plans from having
any access to the futures markets, and they should eliminate any artificial
legal impediments to such access. The question is not whether trading
commodity futures is appropriate for employee plans, but rather under
what circumstances it is appropriate. Thus, for example, the Department
of Labor and the IRS should not resolve problems stemming from the
ERISA rules governing investment procedures on the baisis of whether
employee plans generally should or should not engage in futures trading.
Such problems must be resolved by addressing on an individual basis
each of the policy justifications for such rules. For example, the question
of whether margin constitutes a plan asset should be resolved in a fashion
which clearly allows plans to trade futures through margin accounts, but
which satisfies the statutory policy that plan assets be managed by and
held by appropriate fudiciaries.
The much more difficult and perhaps overriding question is when, if
ever, it is appropriate to distinguish among the various commodity trad-
ing philosophies or strategems which might be employed on behalf of a
plan. If such distinctions are appropriate, they can be made in the form
of one or more regulations or rules. Alternatively, the formulation of the
distinctions may be left to the ongoing process of determining what is and
is not prudent investment conduct.
The first part of this overriding question, whether distinctions among
trading strategems are appropriate; appears to be, but is not, a simple
matter. Speculation in agricultural futures seems to have much less to do
with the purposes of employee plans than does hedging Treasury Bills
with Treasury Bill futures contracts. However, it can be said that it is
impossible to construct a perfect hedge transaction. 161 Moreover, what
constitutes hedging to one observer may be viewed as a variety of specu-
lation by another observer. Even if it were possible in all cases to distin-
guish hedging from speculation, speculation may be appropriate for some
varieties of plans but not for others. A judgment on a particular trading
strategy cannot be divorced from the circumstances of the particular plan
which is utilizing that strategy. Therefore, to distinguish among the vari-
ous ways of using commodity futures may in the abstract be appropriate,
but as a practical matter it may be very difficult to make such distinc-
tions in a meaningful way.
If it is decided that meaningful distinctions among trading strategems
can be made, and that they should be incorporated into one or more regu-
261 At any given time, the price of a futures contract may be more or less than the
prevailing cash price for the commodity. Over any significant period of time, however, this
difference fluctuates for a variety of reasons. Thus it is impossible during the several months
involved in any hedge transaction to be certain that the profit or loss on the futures position
will exactly offset the loss or profit on the cash position. To this extent it may be argued
that no hedge can be known in advance to be "perfect" although it may turn out to be so.
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lations or rules, the temptation to create an inflexible de facto legal list of
permissible uses should be avoided. Furthermore, for the reasons dis-
cussed above, the drafters of such regulations or rules would face difficult
questions as to the number and kinds of distinctions that can or should
be made.
Allowing the determination of which uses of commodity futures are
appropriate to be made solely by reference to the prudence rules is ap-
pealing, both because of the difficulties discussed above and because a
determination of appropriateness is so similar to a determination of pru-
dence. In this regard, it should be recalled that the Department of Labor
prudence regulation is intended as a "safe harbor." The Department of
Labor has not precluded the justification of investments or investment
techniques on a basis other than that described in the regulation. How-
ever, a decision to allow the courts to determine the prudence of particu-
lar futures trading programs on a case-by-case basis will leave plans with
years of uncertainty as to whether a particular strategy may or may not
be legally permissible.
Whether it is the courts, the Congress, or the regulators who are ulti-
mately to determine the extent to which employee plans will be able to
utilize the futures markets, the guiding principle must be the best inter-
est of employee plan beneficiaries. It is the view of the authors that the
starting point in such an inquiry is the question whether trustees or in-
vestment managers should concentrate on maximizing the return on capi-
tal or should concentrate on the preservation of capital, realizing of
course, that in an inflationary economy the latter can at times depend
upon the former. Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Halperin, as
evidenced by the development of his thinking on plan investments be-
tween February and September 1980, 12 has tried to utilize such an analy-
tical approach. Unless such an approach is widely adopted, the law gov-
erning employee plans and commodity futures will continue to be
inconsistent. Plans will be able to utilize commodity futures only with the
aid of expert legal advice which enables them to chart a difficult course
between two highly particularized bodies of law. Until the legal problems
we have described are resolved in a more straightforward fashion, the
practical effect will be limited use of the futures markets on the part of
employee plans, which is the same as substituting inertia for the reasoned
application of social policy.t
162 See text accompanying notes 114 & 124 supra.
t On November 3, 1980, after this article had been sent to the publisher, the IRS re-
leased to the public Private Letter Ruling 8044023 concerning the question whether UBTI
or UDFI would be realized by employee plans investing in a limited partnership registered
as a 1940 Act Investment Company which in turn traded in futures as a general hedge
against the fund's portfolio of long-term bonds. The IRS noted that the employee plans, as
limited partners, would realize UBTI or UDFI if any income of the partnership was treata-
ble as such. However, the IRS held that the fund's futures trading would not result in UBTI
or UDFI.
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The IRS reasoned that income from futures trading was income from the sale of prop-
erty within the meaning of § 512(b)(5) and was therefore not treatable as UBTL See text
accompanying note 98 supra. With regard to UDFI, the IRS stated that the fund, in trading
futures, was not purchasing the underlying commodities, since the fund intended to avoid
delivery by closing out all positions prior to the delivery month. According to the IRS, the
fund would merely be entering into a series of "executory arrangements" which would not
involve any acquisition indebtedness.
Private Letter Rulings may not be cited as precedent. LR.C. § 6110(J)(3). Also, the IRS
might not reach the same conclusion it reached in Private Letter Ruling 8044023 under a
different set of facts, such as speculation, trading for delivery, direct trading, or trading
through non-1940 Act pooled investment vehicles. Nonetheless, the reasoning behind the
ruling, that futures trading qualifies for the § 512(b)(5) exception to UBTI treatment and
does not involve acquisition indebtedness so long as delivery is avoided, indicates an evolv-
ing IRS position in harmony with the arguments set forth above. See text accompanying
note 119 supra.
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